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Interest-Free Loans:

The Odyssey of a Misnomer
KENNETH F. JOYCE AND LOUIS A. DEL COTTO *

Introduction
The taxation of "interest-free loans" has been the subject of several

recent cases which have caused a good deal of commentary.' The authors hesitate to add to this flow of material, but feel that confusion has

arisen from a failure to perceive that there are two different types of
so-called interest-free loans, that neither is properly, or at least fully,
described as an interest-free loan, and that the two different types of

loans raise very different types of tax questions under both the income
tax and the unified gift and estate tax system.

As this analysis will show, the major distinction is between the interest-free term loan and the interest-free demand loan. Although all

loans involve the use of money (or other property), in a term loan, the
borrower receives the right to use the money loaned for a certain period
of time (a year, a month, a day). In a demand loan, however, the borrower does not receive the right to the use of the money for any particular period, but is allowed to use the money for only as long as the lender
wishes. This economic difference between the term loan and the demand

loan leads to widely divergent analyses of the tax consequences of the
two types of loans.
With respect to a term loan, what is present is really a hybrid trans* Kenneth F. Joyce and Louis A. Del Cotto are Professors of Law, Faculty of
Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1 See, e.g., Duhl & Fine, Interest-free Loans and the Tax Court: Is Dean
Weakening Under IRS Attacks?, 51 J. TAXATION 322 (1979); Edwards, What
Planning Opportunities Does CA 7s No-gift-tax Holding in Crown Open Up?,
50 J. TAXATION 168 (1979); Roth, Can Lender be Charged with Receiving Taxable Income as a Result of an Interest-free Loan?, 52 J. TAXATION 136 (1980);
Taylor & Schnee, Interest-FreeLoans: A Need for Caution, 58 TAXEs 263 (1980);
Comment, Gift and Income Tax Consequences of Interest-Free Demand Loans,
1979 ILL. L. FORUM 643; Comment, An Interest-Free Borrower or Lender Be:
Gift Tax Implications of Interest-FreeLoans, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 941 (1978). For
discussions which predate the more recent cases, see Keller, The Tax Consequences
of Interest-FreeLoans from Corporations to Shareholders and from Employers to
Employees, 19 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 231 (1978) (herein cited as Keller);

O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-FreeLoans, 27 VAND. L. REv. 1085 (1974).
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action where the lender (1) transfers a certain amount (e.g., $9) of a principal sum (e.g., $100) with no requirement of repayment, and (2) transfers the remaining amount (i.e., $100 minus $9) with a requirement of
payment with an interest charge. The tax consequences which would
apply to such a bifurcated transaction are relatively straightforward, and
we conclude that these same consequences should apply to the interestfree term loan.
The interest-free demand loan, on the other hand, is a completely
revocable transaction and, since the borrower never receives the right
to use the money for any particular time, it could be properly viewed
as no loan at all. Since it is fundamentally indistinguishable from a
revocable trust, we conclude that the basic principles of taxation which
attend such trusts should apply to demand loans. We further conclude,
however, that the implementation of those principles requires some
modification, since in a demand loan, where the money loaned is commingled with the other assets of the borrower, it is not possible to measure the tax consequences with the precision that is possible with respect
to a revocable trust. It is necessary, therefore, to measure the tax consequences, to both lender and borrower, by assuming that the money
loaned has earned a certain rate of interest for the borrower for the outstanding period of the loan.
Within this basic dichotomy between term loans and demand loans,
our discussion will (1) distinguish between gratuitous loans (i.e., intrafamily donative transactions) and nongratuitous loans (e.g., by an employer to an employee) with separate attention to loans by corporations
to shareholders, (2) compare loans of cash with loans of noncash property, and (3) analyze the tax consequences (a) to both lender and borrower, and (b) under both the income tax and (in the case of gratuitous
loans) the unified gift and estate tax system.

Term Loans
Gratuitous Transfers
Economic Analysis

The analysis begins by way of an example: A and B are both cash
basis taxpayers. A gives to B $100 on December 31, 1980 (year one),
repayable by B "without interest" on December 31, 1981 (year two),
and the usual or prime rate of interest for borrowed money is 10 percent
per annum. Economically, A has transferred a value of $100 and received back as consideration a value of $91, the present value of $100
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payable in one year at 10 percent interest.2 Thus, the economic effect is
that A has (1) made a gift 3 of $9, the present value of $10 for one
year; I and (2) received from B a claim with a present value of $91.1
So viewed, it is seen that the term "interest-free loan" is a misnomer.
What we have is a hybrid transaction which is part gift, part loan, and
the loan is made at a market rate of interest.

Income Tax Analysis

This economic analysis indicates that there are income tax consequences flowing to both A and B from the transaction described. B has
gain of $9 in 1980, the amount he has received without liability for repayment. This gain is "income" within the meaning of section 61 of
the Internal Revenue Code, "all income from whatever source derived," I
but is excluded by section 102(a). It also follows that, on payment of
$100 by B to A, A has interest income of $9 ($100 minus the $91 basis
A has in his claim against B) and B has a $9 interest deduction under
section 163(a) 7 for the year 1981.1
The question arises whether the authorities under the tax law support
a finding of interest so as to arrive at the above tax results for A and B.
The authorities fall into four separate, although somewhat overlapping,
categories: (1) cases refusing to find interest for A; 9 (2) cases finding
gain to B and also allowing an interest deduction to B to wash the
2The more precise figure for the present value of $100 is $90.90909 derived
from the use of the formula:
p -

n

(1 ± i) t
where P is the present value of $100 (n) to be received a year (t) from the

present and where the interest rate (i) is 10 percent.

3 Assuming a motive of "detached and disinterested generosity." Comm'r v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
4 10

1.1
5 100 -91
1.1

6 See Del Cotto, The Trust Annuity as Income: The Constitutional Problem of
Taxing Gifts and Bequests as Income, 23 TAX L. REv. 231 (1968), for a discussion of gifts as income.

7 For prepaid interest, see section 461(g); Keller at 262. See also N. 73 infra

and the accompanying text.

8 Rev. Rul. 73-482, 1973-2 C.B. 44, and authorities cited therein.
9 Crown v. Comm'r, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978); Johnson v. United States,

254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 34 T.C. 416 (1960);
Society Brand Clothes, Inc., 18 T.C. 304 (1952); Combs Lumber Co., 41 B.T.A.
339 (1940).
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gain; 10 (3) cases finding A has made a gift of the interest; 11 and (4)
an application of the theory of section 483 under section 61 of the Code.
The discussion of the cases in the first category, which involve the demand loan, will be deferred to the portion of this article dealing with
the demand loan. Suffice it to say that a payment repayable on demand
is in the nature of a revocable transfer and thus cannot be equated, as
can a term loan, with a part gift, part interest-bearing loan. The second
category of cases offers a mixed result in that, although it arguably finds
gain for B, it also allows a simultaneous deduction for payment of interest and washes the gain. Because these cases do not deal with gratuitous transfers, a discussion of them is postponed to the next portion of
this article, where the position will be taken that they are improperly
decided. The third category will also be dealt with, both as part of the
fourth category, and also in the part of this article dealing with the gift
tax implications of interest-free term loans. The main burden of this
portion of the article will be to state the position that the theory of section 483 should be used to implement the section 61 analysis made at
the beginning of this section.
Theory of Section 483. Section 483 provides generally that in the
case of a contract for the sale or exchange of property, any unstated interest shall be returned as a ratable portion of each deferred payment
made under the contract.' 2 Unstated interest is the difference between
the sum of the payments due under the contract and the sum of the
present values of such payments. For example, A sells goods, which
have a value of $100, to B for $110 payable one year later, without
interest. Under the theory of section 483(b), the excess of $110 over
$100 (the present value of $1 10 in one year at 10 percent interest 13)
is unstated interest. This is the prototype of the transaction which sec14
tion 483 was intended to cover.
10 Charles E. Marsh, 73 T.C. 317 (1979); Joseph Creel, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979);
Max Zager, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979); Herman M. Greenspun, 72 T.C. 931 (1979);
J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961); William G. Martin, 39 T.C.M. 531
(1979); Albert Suttle, 37 T.C.M. 1638 (1978).
11 Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975); Gertrude H. Blackburn,
20 T.C. 204 (1953); Estate of Berkman, 38 T.C.M. 183 (1979).
12 See generally Carlson, Income Tax Blue Law: Imputation of Interest Under
Section 483, 34 TAx L. REv. 187 (1979).
13 Section 483 requires the regulations to provide a discount rate and under

section 1.483-1(c) (2) (ii) (B) of the regulations the interest rate prescribed is
7 percent per annum compounded semiannually, giving a discount rate of 93.351
percent, instead of the 90.90909 percent discount rate derived from the 10 percent simple interest rate we are using. Reg. § 1.483-1 (g) (2), Table IV. Note that
new test and imputed interest rates under section 483 were proposed for sales of
property entered into on or after September 29, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 57,739 (Aug.
29, 1980).

14 H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1963); S. REP. No. 830, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1964).
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There is no reason, however, why section 483 would not also apply
where A intends to make a gift to B of a portion of the goods transferred."5 Thus, if B agreed to make the deferred payment only in the
amount of $100, then the unstated interest is $9 ($100 less $91, the
present value of $100 in one year at 10 percent interest).16 A has made
a gift of $9 worth of goods, and has sold the rest for $91 plus $9 of
interest, payable by B in one year.
Applying the theory of section 483 to the loan example, where A
loans B, on December 31, 1980, $100 repayable in one year without interest, the tax consequences would be similar to those of the part sale,
part gift example. B, in 1980, receives $9 of gross income, excludable
under section 102 (a), with a section 1015 (a) carryover basis of $9. On
payment of $100 to A in 1981, B will have an interest deduction of $9
under section 163 (a). A, in 1980, makes a gift of $9 and loans to B $91.
In 1981, A will have $9 of interest income.
Is Section 483 Restricted to Sales of "Property"? By its terms, the
application of section 483 is limited to contracts for "the sale or exchange of property." 17 The committee reports discuss the section in
terms of the sale of "a capital asset," 18 revealing no explicit intent that
its terms should apply to a loan with unstated interest. Indeed, in Crown
v. Commissioner,"9 the Seventh Circuit, in refusing to impute interest on
a demand loan, stated that Congress recognized the principle of imputed
interest, but "limited its applicability" in the enactment of section 483.20
It is true that Congress, in response to a certain line of cases, seemed
only to be addressing the perceived problem in the context of sales of
assets other than cash. These cases seemed to turn on lack of proof that
there was any amount by which deferred price exceeded the value of
goods sold and a reluctance to admit parol evidence to vary a clear
written contract.2 1 Other cases, however, admitted clear evidence out'5

Keller at 266.

e.g., Reg. § 1.483-1(b) (6) Ex. 6. Compare Fox v. United States, 510
F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1975).
17 I.R.C. § 483(a).
18 H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1963); S. REP. No. 830, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1964).
19 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
16See,

Id. at 240.
21 Prior to section 483, some of the decided cases refused to find any element
of interest discount on sales of goods for deferred payments where no interest was
mentioned in the sale contract. Thus, in Elliott Paint & Varnish Co., 44 B.T.A.
20

241 (1941), the buyer agreed to pay $40,000 in noninterest bearing deferred payments for a building after a cash offer of $27,500 was refused. The seller agreed
to the $40,000 price after advice that this amount represented $27,500 plus
interest at 5 percent over the payout period. The buyer was disallowed the interest
deduction on a number of grounds: (1) The evidence did not support a finding
that the cash value of the property was $27,500; (2) any difference between a
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side the written contract in order to show interest was intended.22 And,
2 3 the difference
in Estate of Starr v. Commissioner,
between the normal
selling price of the sprinkler system sold and the total amount of deferred
payments was held to be interest.
It would, therefore, appear that section 483 was designed for, and
its express terms should be limited to, a narrow category of cases where
the presence of interest is unclear. Where an amount is clearly attributable to the time value of money, it has the economic function of interest
and should be treated as such.24 The leading case is United States v.
Midland-Ross Corp.,25 where noninterest-bearing notes were purchased
at a discount and the gain on their later sale prior to maturity was
denied capital gain treatment. The gain was held to be "earned original
deferred payment price and a cash price may reflect the additional risk inherent
in deferred payments, rather than the time value of money; and (3) the clear
written agreement could not be contradicted by ambiguous parol evidence.
In accord with the result and reasoning in Elliott Paint & Varnish Co. are
Hundahl v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1941); Kingsford Co., 41 T.C.
646 (1964); Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461, 488 (1961), afT'd, 325 F.2d 313 (9th
Cir. 1963), afT'd, 380 U.S. 563 (1965). In Brown, neither the Court of Appeals
,nor the Supreme Court passed on this point.
22
See, e.g., Estate of Berry, 43 T.C. 723 (1965), afT'd, 372 F.2d 476 (6th Cir.
1967); Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25 (1948); Raleigh Properties, Inc., 21 T.C.M. 812
(1962).
23 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959).
24 Where noninterest bearing notes are purchased at a discount, the rule is
settled that the discount is interest where it serves the function of interest. The
leading case is United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965), where
noninterest bearing notes were purchased at a discount and the gain on their
later sale prior to maturity was treated by the taxpayer as capital gain. The
Supreme Court held, however, that it was ordinary income in the nature of
"earned original issue discount" rather than market appreciation-i.e., it was
simply the amount earned by the investment due to the passage of time. This
conclusion is supported by Estate of Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th
Cir. 1959).
In accord with this basic theory are the cases requiring "income forecast"
reporting of interest discount rather than open end (basis recovery first) reporting. In Darby Investment Corp., 37 T.C. 839 (1962), afl'd, 315 F.2d 551 (6th
Cir. 1963), taxpayer bought land contracts at a discount from home builders and
was required to report a ratable portion of each monthly payment as interest, prior
to recovery of full cost. The case stated that open end reporting under Burnet v.
Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), would be allowed only where recovery of cost was
speculative. Wingate E. Underhill, 45 T.C. 489 (1966), expanded on this idea,
holding that open end reporting required proof to a reasonable certainty that
taxpayer would not recover his cost and a major portion of the discount.
Closely related to these cases, which involved purchases at a discount for cash,
are the following deferred sales of property cases where a lump-sum consideration
is discounted to present value by the seller on computing his amount realized. The
deferred payments are held to include a ratable portion of the interest discount:
Tombari v. Comm'r, 299 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1962); Judith Schneider, 65 T.C. 18
(1975); Shafpa Realty Corp., 8 B.T.A. 283 (1927).
25 381 U.S. 54 (1965).
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issue discount" 26 rather than market appreciation, that is, it was simply
the amount earned by the investment due to the passage of time.
The principle of Estate of Starr and Midland-Ross Corp.-where
the value of the asset sold is known, any increment not due to market
risk is interest-would seem to preclude the notion that the enactment
of section 483 preempts application of its principle to related transactions where the principle was applied under section 61 prior to the enactment of section 483. Indeed, in discussing the question of whether
certain Code provisions preempted the Midland-Ross Corp. result,
the Supreme Court noted that those provisions "may demonstrate, not
that the general rule was to the contrary, but that the general rule was
unclear . . . and that Congress wished to avoid any doubt as to its
treatment of particular situations." 27 This observation would seem
squarely to apply to section 483, leaving intact the general application
of its theory to related transactions under section 61 .2
Further support for this proposition is found in the cases finding a
gift where property is transferred, or a loan is made, at bargain interest.
In the earliest case, Gertrude H. Blackburn,2 a taxable gift was found
where a note received in exchange for property carried 2.25 percent
interest and the usual rate then charged on real estate mortgage loans
was 4 percent. The difference between the value of the note and the value
of the property transferred, attributable to this bargain interest, was held
subject to the gift tax. Similarly, in Mason v. United States,30 the taxpayer sold property to a charity for an amount equal to its value, but the
note received as most of the consideration carried an interest rate below
market. The court held that the taxpayer was entitled to a charitable
deduction equal to the difference between the value transferred and the
value of the cash and note received. In Estate of Berkman"' term loans
made at an interest rate below the prime interest rate for bank loans were
held taxable gifts in the amount of the difference between the amount of
the loans and the discounted value of the notes. The court found Blackburn to be "strikingly similar" 12 and relied on Blackburn to find that the
rate of interest must be considered in finding the value of the note. 3
2(GId. at 57.
27 Id. at 60.
2

See also Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), holding that the recovery
exclusion of section 111 was not to be limited to the three categories enumerated
in the statute. "Congress," said the Court, "would hardly expect the courts to
repeat the same error in another class of cases." Id. at 506.
29 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
30 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975).
31 38 T.C.M. 183 (1979).
32 Id. at n.4.

33 Ibid.
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The theory of section 483, then, should not be viewed as confined
only to sales of property, despite the dictum of the Seventh Circuit in
Crown. The decided cases relevant to the term loan are contrary to this
dictum and, if the Crown dictum has any relevance whatsoever, it must
be limited to the demand loan involved in that case. In fact, Judge
Simpson, relying on Blackburn, criticized the Crown result even for the
demand loan in his dissenting opinion in Crown:
There is no doubt that when a loan is made interest free or at a rate of
interest below the prevailing rate for such a loan, an even exchange has
not taken place. For example, if $100 is loaned for 1 year interest free
when the prevailing interest rate for such a loan is 6 percent, the present
value of the promise to repay such a loan in 1 year is worth less than
$100; on the marketplace, an informed buyer would be willing to pay
approximately $94 for the right to receive $100 a year later. In such a
case, the amount transferred is $100, but the consideration received for
34
it is only $94. There has been a gift of $6.
Effect of Assignment of Income Doctrine on the Section 61/483
Result. The above analysis does not apply the assignment of income
doctrine; that is, it does not tax A on the income received by B through
B's investment of the loan proceeds. If, for example, in 1980 A made a
gratuitous assignment to B of one year's interest payable on A's bond,
$10, A would be taxable on the $10 in the year it is received by B, and
B would receive the $10 tax free as a section 102 gift.3" The result differs
from that provided by the section 61/483 analysis in three respects.
First of all, in the bond example, A is viewed as continuing owner of the
right to the income; therefore, he is taxed when B receives it. 6 Thus, if
B receives the income in 1980, year one, A includes it for 1980. The
result differs from the one in the loan example where A had no income
until the loan was repaid with interest in 1981, year two. Thus, application of the assignment of income rule to the loan example could (and in
the example would) accelerate the income to A from 1981, year two, to
1980, year one. The second difference is in the amount of income received by A and B. A's income will be the entire $10 paid to B, rather
than the $9 interest as in the loan example. B will have $10 of gross
income for 1980 (instead of $9), and will exclude it under section 102.
The third difference is that B will have no interest deduction in 1981 since
67 T.C. at 1068.
35 See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Galt v. Comm'r, 216
F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954).
34

36 Rev. Rul. 69-102, 1969-1 C.B. 32; Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579
(1941); Austin v. Comm'r, 161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947); S.M. Friedman, 41

T.C. 428 (1963), afl'd, 346 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1965); Rev. Rul. 72-312, 1972-1
C.B. 22. But see Rev. Rul. 55-278, 1955-1 C.B. 471.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

1980]

INTEREST-FREE LOANS

he has not received a loan, and is not paying interest. Thus, the loan
result somewhat ameliorates the effect of the assignment of income rule
as to the amounts of gross income for A and B, and also affects the
timing. Furthermore, the assignment of income rule produces the result
of denying to B an interest deduction.
The difference in result between the loan transaction and the gratuitous assignment transaction arises from the fact that in the latter the
assignor has retained a reversionary interest in the property transferredin terms of the familiar fruit-tree metaphor, A has transferred the fruit
while retaining the tree.3 7 The question is whether the loan transaction
can be similarly viewed. In addressing this question, the basic issue is
whether, when A loans to B $100 in cash, interest free, A has retained
a reversion in the subject matter of the gift, or whether he has ended all
of his own ownership in the cash gratuitously transferred. Where A
transfers one year's rents from Blackacre, retaining the remainder in fee,
there is a clear reversion in a discrete nonfungible asset which has been
retained by A. On the other hand, if A conveys to B a percentage of the
fee in Blackacre as a tenant in common, A has retained no reversion in
the interest transferred and will not be taxable on the rents of Blackacre
thereafter received by B. 38
Is a reversion retained when cash is transferred? Certainly it would
be possible for A to put $100 into his savings account or to invest it in
a bond, and assign to B one year's interest. In such a case, no one doubts
that the assignment of income rules would treat A as continuing owner
of the savings account or bond and tax him on B's receipt of interest. 39
A like result would be obtained if A conveyed $100 to a trust, to pay B
the income for one year, and then return $100 to A. 40
The loan transaction, however, is to be distinguished from these
examples. Under our section 61/483 analysis, A is not keeping his title
in an asset and assigning only the income therefrom. Rather, B becomes
the sole owner of the entire $100, receiving $9 as a gift and $91 as a
loan. Indeed, if the transaction was restructured as two transactionsan outright gift of $9 in one transaction and a loan of $91 at 10 percent
interest in a second transaction-the true economic effect of the $100
interest-free loan is revealed. A retains no reversion in the $9 conveyed
37

See generally Del Cotto, Property in the Capital Asset Definition: Influence
of "Fruit and Tree", 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 17-24 (1965); Lyon & Eustice,
Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17
TAx
L. REv. 295 (1962).
38

See, e.g., I.T. 4003, 1950-1 C.B. 10.

39 See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Galt v. Comm'r, 216

F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954).
40 I.R.C. §§ 671, 673.
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as a gift, and he should not be taxed on any income B earns with the $9.
As to the $91, A technically retains no ownership interest in that cash
since B may do with it as he pleases, owing A only a like amount of
dollars, with interest. In essence, this portion of the transaction is properly viewed as a "sale" of the $91 cash by A to B, in consideration of
B's promise to repay $100 in one year. No reversion is retained in the
$91. Furthermore, since the purpose of the assignment of income doctrine is to prevent A from shifting the income tax to B on a gratuitous
assignment, with respect to the $91, there is no occasion for applying
that doctrine; A has received full consideration for the transfer and is
not engaged in an attempt to avoid income.4 Therefore, A is not viewed
as continuing owner of either the $9 or the $91, and the section 61/483
analysis is not preempted by the assignment of income doctrine.
It should be noted that in the savings account/bond/trust examples
discussed above, A is viewed as having a reversion and assigning only
income. This is somewhat fictitious because in none of those examples
is A likely to have returned to him the original cash transferred. Therefore, an argument is present that the distinction between those examples
and that of the loan is purely formalistic, and all transfers of cash should
be outside the assignment of income rule. That proposition need not be
debated here, but note that whatever the outcome of such a debate, the
loan should not be treated as an assignment of income.
Gift and Estate Tax Consequences
When A transfers $100 to B, repayable in one year without interest,
has A made a transfer of property by gift within the meaning of the gift
tax provisions of the Code? 42 As discussed in our income tax analysis,
the economic and income tax analysis is that A has transferred a value
of $100 and received back as consideration a value of $91, the present
value of $100 payable in one year at 10 percent interest. Thus, there
has been $9 of gift under the income tax.
The result for the income tax leads to an identical analysis and result
for the gift tax: There has been a transfer for less than an adequate
consideration in the amount of $9 and that amount is subject to the gift
tax. This is the position taken by the Internal Revenue Service,43 and by
41

Estate of Stranahan v. Comm'r, 472 F.2d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 1973). See
generally Joyce & Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and BA Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out Income Interests, 31 TAX L.
REv.
121, 176-79 (1976).
42
I.R.C. §§ 2501 et seq.
43

Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408. The $3,000 annual exclusion has been
ignored throughout this article.
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the Tax Court in Gertrude H. Blackburn 4' and Estate of Berkman,45
discussed above in connection with section 483.
When A dies, what are the estate tax consequences to A's estate of the
transaction with B? As to the $100 claim A has against B, -thatamount
would be included in A's estate under section 2033 at its discounted
value.416 Thus, if A had died immediately after the $100 was transferred
to B, $91, the present value of the claim for $100, when due in one year,
would be within section 2033. This, of course, is further proof of the fact
that A did, in fact, transfer $9 by gift to B during his life. The estate tax
consequences for the $9 gift are slightly more complex. Prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, that transfer would have had no estate tax consequences unless it was made in contemplation of death within the meaning of then section 2035. Today, section 2035 will recapture all transfers made within three years of decedent's death, regardless of his motive.
So if A dies within three years of the gift, $9 will be returned to his gross
estate under section 2035. If A survives the transfer by more than three
years, section 2035 no longer would apply; however, the $9 will be
7
included in the estate tax base as an adjusted taxable gift.
Nongratuitous Transfers
Economic Analysis
In the broad category of nongratuitous transfers, we will deal with
two basic transactions: an interest-free term loan made by A, in connection with B's rendering of services to A, and such a loan made by a
corporation to its shareholder. Since the results are so similar, we will
focus on the services situation and merely contrast the corporate-shareholder example in the course of our main discussion.
The economic analysis for the situation where B renders services to A
is basically identical to that for the gratuitous transfer, except that the
$9 is not a gift, but rather is compensation for services to B. Assume
again that A and B are both cash basis taxpayers, that A transfers to B
$100 on December 31, 1980, year one, repayable by B without interest
on December 31, 1981, year two, and that the usual or prime rate of
interest for borrowed money is 10 percent per annum. Economically, A
has transferred $100 and has received back a claim against B for $91,
the present value of $100 repayable in one year at 10 percent, together
20 T.C. 204 (1953).
45 38 T.C.M. 183 (1979). See also Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th
Cir. 1975).
44

46

47

Estate of Berkman, 38 T.C.M. 183 (1979).
I.R.C. § 2001 (b) (1) (B).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

470

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:

with $9 worth of B's (past and/or future) services. Thus, the economic
effect is that A has (1) paid to B compensation for services of $9, the
present value of $10 for one year, and (2) received from B full consideration, a claim with a present value of $91, and $9 of services.
So viewed, it is seen again that interest-free loan is a misnomer. It is
a hybrid transaction which is part compensation, part loan, and the loan
is made at a market rate of interest. There is no difference between this
unitary transaction and two separate transactions wherein A pays B $9
for services and loans him $91 for a year at 10 percent interest.
Income Tax Analysis
This economic analysis indicates there are income tax consequences
flowing to both A and B from the transaction described. B has gross
income of $9 in 1980, the amount he has received without liability for
repayment. This gain is compensation income and is within section 61.
This result is supported by our section 61/483 analysis and the authorities discussed in connection with gratuitous transfers, to the effect that
the amount of the difference between the value of property (or amount
of cash) transferred and the present value of the debt obligation received
was a gratuitous transfer by gift.48 In the employment situation, this
amount represents compensation for services.
This economic analysis also indicates that B, when he repays $100 in
1981, will have an interest deduction for that year.49 The $100 payment
represents $91 of principal and $9 of interest. Under this analysis, the
tax consequences for A, the employer, are also clear. The $9 paid to B
for services, assuming it is incurred in business, will be a deduction to A
in 1980 under section 162. A has paid $100 cash to B and has received
from B a claim valued at $91; the other $9 has been paid to B as compensation. And, when B repays $100 to A in 1981, A will have interest
income of $9 in that year. Thus, the income tax consequences for A
parallel those for B: A has a deduction for 1980 for a payment to B
of $9. B has a deduction in 1981 for payment of interest to A of $9 and
A has interest income in 1981.
The Decided Cases. This income tax analysis has been made solely
by reference to the previous economic analysis. The decided cases, however, give a quite different result. Since the original decision on the
48 Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975); Gertrude H. Blackburn, 20 T.C. 204 (1953); Estate of Berkman, 38 T.C.M. 183 (1979); Rev. Rul.
73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
49 Rev. Rul. 73-482, 1973-2 C.B. 44, and the authorities cited therein. For
prepaid interest, see section 461(g), Keller at 262, and N. 73 infra and the accompanying text.
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issue, J. Simpson Dean,5 ° there has been a host of decided cases involving the interest-free loan. 5 The first of those in which the Tax Court
5 2 In essence,
broadly reviewed the Dean issue is Herman M. Greenspun.
all of the decided cases rely upon the rationale of Dean and Greenspun,
and so our discussion will focus mainly upon those two cases.
In Dean, the taxpayers borrowed, over a two-year period from a corporation they controlled, more than $2 million, interest free. The Commissioner contended that the taxpayers realized income to the extent of
the economic benefit derived from the free use of borrowed funds and
that such benefit was equal to the prime rate of interest at which taxpayers
could have borrowed the money. 53 In support of his position, the Commissioner relied upon a series of cases holding that rent-free use of corporate property by a shareholder or officer of the corporation results in
the realization of income in the amount of the rental value of the
4
property5
The Tax Court in Dean appears to have made three separate responses
to the Commissioner's argument. Apparently in response to his broad
economic benefit argument, the court noted that the Commissioner had
no square authority that an interest-free loan would result in the "realization of taxable income by the debtor," 11 and stated: "Although the
question may not be completely free from doubt we think that no taxable income is realized in such circumstances." 56 The court's second
response was in distinguishing the rent-free use of corporate property
cases:
In each of them a benefit was conferred upon the stockholder or officer in
circumstances such that had the stockholder or officer undertaken to procure the same benefit by an expenditure of money such expenditure would
not have been deductible by him. Here, on the other hand, had petitioners
borrowed the funds in question on interest-bearing notes, their payment
of interest would have been fully deductible by them under section 163,
I.R.C. 1954. Not only would they not be charged with the additional
income in controversy
herein, but they would have a deduction equal to
7
that very amount.
50 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
51 Charles E. Marsh, 73 T.C. 317 (1979); Joseph Creel, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979);
Max Zager, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979); Herman M. Greenspun, 72 T.C. 931 (1979);
William G. Martin, 39 T.C.M. 531 (1979); Albert Suttle, 38 T.C.M. 1638
(1978), afl'd, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980).
52 72 T.C. 931 (1979).
53 35 T.C. at 1087.
54 See, e.g., Charles A. Frueauff, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934), and cases cited in Dean,
35 T.C. at 1089, and in Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 945.
55 35 T.C. at 1089.
56 Ibid.
57 Id. at 1090.
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In a third response, the court went on to note the authorities denying an
interest deduction to borrowers of interest-free loans, and denying interest income to the lender,"8 concluding it to be "equally true that an
interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower." 59 The dissenting opinions objected to the majority anticipating the interest deduction and finding no taxable income when the issue presented was one of
gross income. These opinions also noted that any interest deduction
would be denied by section 265 (2) if the loan was used to purchase taxexempt obligations. 60
In Greenspun, Howard Hughes made to the taxpayer a $4 million
eight-year loan (later extended to 35 years) at 3 percent annual interest,
expecting in return favorable press coverage of his activities. The Commissioner argued that Greenspun had gross income in the year of the
loan on the annual difference between 3 percent and 6 percent (the 6
percent rate was the minimum a bank would charge on a similar loan),
for the term of the loan, discounted to present value at the time of the
loan. 6 After finding that the bargain interest was given for future consideration to be furnished by taxpayer and that therefore economic
benefit was received within the meaning of section 61,62 the Tax Court
held nevertheless that under Dean no income was realized by taxpayer
upon receipt of the loan.
The ground of the holding is, however, somewhat ambiguous. First
of all, the court again implicitly rejected the Commissioner's analogy to
the rent-free use of corporate property cases by quoting the language in
the Dean opinion to the effect those cases involve no offsetting interest
deduction, and then stated that in so distinguishing these cases the holding of no taxable income "was not grounded on the imputed interest
deduction, but rather was based on the conclusion that 'an interest-free
loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower.'" 63 This language is
puzzling in light of the stated ground for the distinction, and also in
light of the later rationale for the holding articulated at great length in
the Greenspun opinion, to the effect that it is the imputed interest deduction which prevents the presence of taxable income.
The Tax Court articulated its rationale as follows:
In holding that no income was realized . . . in Dean . . . we reasoned that had the taxpayers borrowed the funds on interest-bearing notes,
58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.
60

Id. at 1090-92.

61 72 T.C. at 940-41, 950.
62
63

d. at 945-47.
d. at 946.
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their payment of interest would have been fully deductible under section
163. Underlying this reasoning was the idea that, economically speaking,
an interest-free loan from a corporation to its shareholder or employee is
in substance no different from the making of a loan on which interest is
charged accompanied by an increase in dividends or compensation in an
amount equal to the interest charged. Consequently, to give effect to the
economic reality of the situation, we attempted in Dean to equalize the tax
treatment of the two loan transactions.
To illustrate this point, assume that A, an employee of X Co., received
as his only form of compensation an interest-free loan from X Co. in the
amount of $20,000 for a period of 1 year. Further assume the prevailing
interest rate at the time was 5 percent or $1,000 a year. The economic
effect of this transaction is the same as if X Co. had charged A interest at
5 percent on the $20,000 loan, and, at the same time, paid him a salary
of $1,000 which A in turn used to pay the interest. Assuming no other
facts, in the second hypothetical, A would have gross income from his
salary of $1,000 and an interest deduction of $1,000 or taxable income of
$0. Consistent with this result, in the first hypothetical involving the
interest-free loan, A's taxable income under our holding in Dean would
be $0.64

Other language in the opinion makes it perfectly clear that the court was
assuming that in its example A paid the $1,000 interest simultaneously
with the receipt of the $21,000 from X Co.6 5 In other words, he prepaid
the interest and so received the deduction in the year the loan was made,
year one, rather than in the year the loan was repaid, year two. 66
There are a number of observations to be made about the reasoning
of the Tax Court in using this example to equate the interest-free loan
with a two-payment transaction wherein the employee receives salary
and simultaneously pays interest. First of all, the equation of the two
transactions appears to admit that the employee in fact receives gross
income in the interest-free loan situation. Although in the example the
amount of the income is not discounted to present value, nevertheless,
the example illustrates that the time when the income is realized is year
one, upon receipt of the loan. In light of this, it is strange indeed that
the court rejected the Commissioner's argument that Greenspun realized
gross income (in the amount of the present value of the bargain interest)
in the year the loan was made. 6 7 The Tax Court's actual response was:
We think respondent's contention misses the point. Although we would
agree if petitioner were to accelerate the realization process by selling his

64 Id. at 947-48.

65 Id. at 950-51.
60 Cf. I.R.C. § 461 (g); see generally Keller at 262.
67

72 T.C. at 950.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:
rights under the loan agreement to a third party, the sale proceeds would
be immediately subject to taxation; however that is not what occurred.
Rather, the economic benefit which respondent seeks to tax is the use
of the funds in question at a preferential rate of interest. By its very
nature, realization of this economic benefit occurs only during each taxable
period in which the funds are actually used or available for use. This being
so, we think it clear, any economic benefit which may flow from the favorable interest rate is realized ratably over the term of the loan. 68
To put this response in terms of our running example, if A loans B
$100 to be repaid in one year without interest, B would not realize $9
of income at the time of the loan, but would realize the actual use value
of $10 over the term of the loan. If, however, A and B had merely
agreed to such a loan, and B sold to C his rights under the agreement for
$9, then B's realization occurs on the sale. What this distinction appears
to disregard is the fact that receipt by B of $9 from A is the same as
receipt of $9 from C; in both situations, B has realized the present value
of the use of $100 for one year, $9. The realization by B takes place
upon receipt in both situations, rather than over the period of the loan.
The second observation concerns the Tax Court's simultaneous interest deduction and its response to the Commissioner's argument that
the taxpayer was not entitled to an offsetting interest deduction because
no interest was actually paid by the cash basis taxpayer. 69 Noting the
general rule that there is no deduction until payment, the court held
that a low- or no-interest case involves an exception in order "to give
recognition to the economic realities of the transaction." o The economic realities, according to the court, were those of its above-quoted
example: Such a loan is the same as A making a loan at market interest
together with a salary payment to B, with a simultaneous prepayment of
interest by B, giving to B, the employee, compensation income together
with an offsetting interest deduction."
For this holding, the Tax Court relied upon Revenue Ruling 73-13.72
There, a corporate executive was provided with personal financial advice
from professional consultants engaged by his employer. The value of
this advice was held to be gross income in the nature of compensation
in kind, and it was also held that there was an offsetting deduction under
section 212, despite the fact that the amount was not actually paid by the
taxpayer. This result is justified, said the Tax Court, because in substance it was the same as if the employer paid the money to its employee
68

Id. at 950-51.
Ibid.
70 Id. at 951.
69
71
72

Ibid.

1973-1 C.B. 42.
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who in turn purchased the financial advice. The gross income would be
offset by the deduction.
It is true that in Revenue Ruling 73-13 there was, economically
speaking, a receipt of salary and at the same time a payment of the
salary for a deductible item. The ruling, therefore, lends support to the
Tax Court's reasoning that simultaneous prepayment of the interest
washed the gross income in its example. The trouble is that the Tax
Court's example does not accurately reflect what happened in Greenspun. Greenspun, although he did receive gross income, did not simul-

taneously repay the value so received as prepaid interest. If A in the Tax
Court's example had been Greenspun, he would have kept the use of the
entire $21,000 ($20,000 loan at 5 percent interest, together with $1,000
of salary), and would have paid the $1,000 interest at the end of the

loan period, one year, rather than simultaneously upon receipt of the
$21,000. Therefore, the deduction could very well have been allowable

in the year following the receipt of salary, year two, and would not be
an offset against gross income in year one.
More importantly, even assuming Greenspun had prepaid the entire
35 years' interest, a deduction would have been properly allowable only

for the portion of the prepayment allocable to the year of payment,
year one.73 Thus, the Commissioner's position in Greenspun would
73 See I.R.C. § 461 (g). As stated in the legislative history to this section:

The Act permits a cash method taxpayer to deduct prepaid interest no earlier
than in the taxable year in which (and to the extent that) the interest represents
a charge for the use or forbearance of borrowed money during that period.
Under this provision, if a taxpayer uses the cash receipts and disbursements
method to compute his taxable income, interest which he pays and which is
properly allocable to any later taxable year must be charged to capital account
and treated as paid by him in the periods in which (and to the extent that) the
interest represents a charge for the use or forbearance of borrowed money during
each such taxable year.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 94TH CONGRESS, 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 100 (Comm. Print

1976).
Section 461(g) was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and applied
only to prepayments of interest after December 31, 1975. It was thus not applicable
to the tax years involved in Greenspun. Nevertheless, the provision renders the
prepayment rationale of Greenspun basically erroneous as to interest-free term
loans to cash basis taxpayers where the loan extends beyond the taxable year in
which it is made.
Moreover, even as to loans which do not extend beyond the taxable year and
even without regard to section 461(g), interest-free term loans to cash basis
taxpayers cannot properly be equated with prepaid interest since the concept of
prepayment does not include a simple discount loan. If, for example, A purports
to loan B $100 at 10 percent and A retains $9 as prepaid interest, it is settled that
the loan will be recast as a loan of $91 at 10 percent interest, and B will receive
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appear to be correct on both counts: There was gross income in year
one in the amount of the present value of the bargain interest, and there
was no offsetting interest deduction since interest, had it been prepaid,

would not have been deductible by Greenspun beyond the portion
thereof allocable to the first year.
Nonetheless, the Tax Court has reaffirmed its Dean/Greenspun position in Max Zager, 4 Joseph Creel,75 Charles E. Marsh,7 and William
G. Martin.7 7 In Zager, the Tax Court further supported this position
under the principle of stare decisis. Dean, said the court, gave effect to
48 years of administrative practice, which practice continued thereafter
an interest deduction of $9 only if and when he repays the $100. John C. Cleaver,
6 T.C. 452, afl'd, 158 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 849
(1947); John Randolph Hopkins, 15 T.C. 160, 180-82 (1950); Rev. Rul. 73-482,
1973-2 C.B. 44. See generally Douglas G. Burck, 63 T.C. 556, 558-59 (1975).
In other words, the amount of a simultaneous prepayment is not considered either
as received by the payor or paid by him.
Thus, when the Tax Court in Greenspun equated an interest-free term loan of
one year to an interest-bearing loan with a simultaneous payment of salary which
was prepaid as interest, it was in conflict with its own authorities in stating that a
deduction would have been allowed. To use the numbers of our example, if A
makes a $100 one-year loan to B at 10 percent interest and simultaneously pays to
B $9 which B immediately "prepays" as interest, the $9 would be held to have
been neither received nor prepaid by B-thus, the true nature of the transaction
would be revealed as a salary payment of $9 and a loan of $91 at 10 percent
interest. The interest deduction would then be allowed if and when B repaid the

$100.
It should be noted that under the authorities cited above, the distinction between
a prepayment and a nonprepayment turns on whether the borrower has received
the gross proceeds of a loan and then later prepays the interest. See, e.g.,
Douglas G. Burck (prepayment made one day after receipt of gross proceeds).
Such a distinction is obviously subject to manipulation and, in combination with
section 461(g), has the effect of allowing a cash basis taxpayer to put himself on
the accrual basis with respect to an interest deduction for any particular taxable
year or part thereof. Suppose, for example, that A makes B a one-year loan of
$100 at 10 percent interest on January 2, repayable on January 2 one year later,
and B prepays A $9 (approximately) on January 3 of the first year. To allow B a
$9 interest deduction is the same as treating B as an accrual basis taxpayer who
has received a one-year loan of $91 at 10 percent interest. This result would also
argue for permitting a borrower such as Greenspun an offsetting deduction for
the period of the taxable year for which the loan is outstanding, if the lender
forgave the interest on an interest-bearing loan one day after the loan proceeds
were transferred. In Greenspun, however, the forgiveness did not occur at a
point in time after the transfer, so as to put Greenspun on the accrual basis; rather,
it occurred simultaneously with the transfer. Thus, Greenspun should not have
been allowed an offsetting deduction for any part of the interest as a deduction for
year one, since there was no payment of interest in that year, by prepayment or
otherwise.
74
72 T.C. 1009 (1979).
75
72 T.C. 1173 (1979).
76 73 T.C. 317 (1979).
77 39 T.C.M. 531 (1979).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

1980]

INTEREST-FREE LOANS

477

for 12 years before the Commissioner published his nonacquiescence.78
Moreover, said the court, although Dean may be a debatable decision,
"[t]oo much water has passed over the dam to warrant reexamining the
situation judicially. We think that the application of the principle of
stare decisis is peculiarly called for here, and that if a contrary result is
deemed desirable, the appropriate remedy should be legislative rather
than judicial." 79 Since Greenspun was decided on the merits, this position of the Tax Court appears to be an afterthought to the decision in
that case. Whatever its merits, they are not the subject of this article.
FurtherObservationson Dean/Greenspun. This portion of this article
will be an attempt to summarize the position the Tax Court has taken in
Dean and Greenspun and, at the same time, to voice our concerns with
that position.
The first point to be made is that the Tax Court improperly rejects the
Commissioner's present value approach in insisting that the economic
gain arising from the value of the use of money is enjoyed only during
the period of that use. The trouble with this position is not that it is untrue, but that it addresses the wrong issue. There is no doubt that the
borrower of money enjoys the use of the funds over the period of the
loan, and any income he earns during that period is unquestionably subject to tax. This is true, but it is not in issue since Greenspun was not
attempting to exclude income earned through the use of the borrowed
money. The only issue with respect to gross income, and the one the
Commissioner raised, was whether Greenspun was taxable on the amount
he received as compensation for services-the present value of the bargain interest over the term of the loan.
In terms of our running example, when A loans B $100 for a year
"without interest," B receives $9 as compensation and a loan of $91 at
10 percent interest. Assume B immediately loans the $100 to C for the
same period at 10 percent interest. At the end of the year, B will have
$10 of interest income from C, that is, the value of the use of the money
for one year. Without doubt, this could not be taxed to B on receipt of
the $100 from A, nor was the Commissioner attempting to do so. At
that time, however, there can and should be taxed to B the portion of
the $100 transferred by A which is compensation for B's services, that is,
the $9 present value of 10 percent, the value of the use for one year.
That value does not arise from the loaned funds, but rather is the difference between the amount loaned, $91, and the amount received,
$100. Thus, at the end of the one-year loan period the overall tax effect
to B should be: gross income of $9 at the inception of the transaction,
78 1973-2 C.B. 4.
7)

72 T.C. at 1013.
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gross income of $10 on collection of interest from C, an interest deduction of $9 on repayment of $100 to A, for an overall result to B of $10
net income. (A will also have, presumably, $10 of income from the
value of B's services, $9 of interest income and a $9 deduction for paying the compensation.) To deny the Commissioner's position, and to
allow the offsetting deduction, as the Tax Court has done, is to tax B on
only the $10 earned from C. This is consonant with the overall result
for B, but it distorts B's gross income (and A's), and raises the related
problem of the timing of the interest deduction. Also, it raises a host of
other problems, all of which we will discuss below.
Our second point is that the Tax Court misapplies or disregards its
own prior authority. It disregards its own decisions in Blackburn and
Estate of Berkman, and also Mason, which, although they deal with
gratuitous transfers, nevertheless support the present value analysis for
both the time of the transfer and the amount transferred. These cases
should-apply whether the transfer is by gift or as compensation. The
misapplication occurred in Dean, where the court distinguished employee taxability in the rent-free use of corporate property cases on the
ground that those cases did not involve an offsetting deduction. 0 The
Dean language was also relied on in Greenspun.8 ' Both cases, therefore, can be criticized for failure to observe that if the employee used the
property for business or income producing purposes, the employee's
imputed rental payment would have been deductible under either section
162 or section 212.82 Indeed, Rodgers Dairy Co.8 3 was just such a case
and this was not noted by the Tax Court, despite the fact it was mentioned
in both Dean 11 and Greenspun 85 as one of the cases upon which the
Commissioner relied.
In Zager, the Tax Court explained its position on the use of property
cases as resulting from a search for a distinction which would support
the long-standing administrative position of the Commissioner, which
observed the distinction between those cases and the interest-free loan for
so long a period. 6 The distinction found, explained the court, was that
a taxpayer would "generally" be entitled to a deduction for payment of
interest, but not for payment of rent.8 7 This clarification of Dean is
80 J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961).
81 72 T.C. at 945-46.
82 See Keller at 237; see also concurring opinion

1091.
83
84

of Judge Opper, 35 T.C. at

14 T.C. 66 (1950).
35 T.C. at 1089.

85
8 6 72 T.C. at 945.

72 T.C at 1011.

87

Ibid.
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helpful, and removes from Dean a great deal of its importance in denying taxability of the economic gain. If Dean distinguishes only those
use of property cases in which imputed rent would be nondeductible,
it becomes clearer that Dean relies upon the imputed interest deduction,
rather than on the absence of realized gain.
A third objection to Dean and Greenspun is the automatic grant of
the interest deduction without regard to its true availability. As the
Greenspun court itself noted, the use of the borrowed funds to purchase
obligations, the interest in which is wholly exempt from income taxes,
would result in disallowance of the interest deduction under section
265(2). In terms of our running example, then, under Greenspun, the
$9 of gross income to B in year one would be washed by the $9 advance
interest deduction, and the $10 of income earned on tax-free municipal
bonds would be wholly tax free. Denial of the interest deduction by
section 265 (2) would be frustrated. Other objections to the Greenspun
methodology were listed by the court. For example, such an approach
would overstate the medical deduction by reducing the 3 percent floor; 88
it would understate the percentage limitations on the charitable contributions deduction; 9 it would overstate allowable deductions for those
whose itemized deductions do not exceed the zero bracket amount; 90
where the loan recipient receives the money from a corporation in which
he is a shareholder, Greenspun would give dividend deduction treatment,
whereas, if the corporation has no available earnings and profits, the
proper result is deduction without dividend income. 9 1 These objections,
and others, were noted by the Tax Court in Greenspun 2 Its response
was simply: "When and if we are confronted with such a case, we will
decide at that time whether Dean is applicable, and if so, whether we
will continue to adhere to our decision in Dean. In the circumstances
of the present case, however, whether or not we rest our conclusion on
Dean, our decision of no deficiency would be the same. In other words,
if petitioner were required to include as income the economic benefit
associated with the loan, he would be deemed to have simultaneously
93
paid an amount of interest equal to the income so reported."
Thus, in Greenspun, the Tax Court continued to suggest that the Dean
result might not depend on the imputed interest deduction, rendering the
objections irrelevant; and, if Dean does depend on the imputed interest
88 1.R.C.
89

§ 213(a) (1).

I.R.C. § 170(b).
90
I.R.C. §§ 63(b), 63(c), 63(d).
91
I.R.C. §§ 316, 301(c).
92 72 T.C. at 949-50; see also Keller at 235-37.
93 72 T.C. at 950.
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deduction, it would decide whether to disallow the deduction when the
appropriate case arose. The Tax Court was unwilling to cross any bridge
until it reached one.
As we have noted, the Tax Court also created a timing problem by
94
allowing to B the interest deduction in the year of the gain, year one.
This problem has been discussed extensively above in the discussion of
Greenspun. We note here only that a deferral of tax is created which is
unfavorable to the government, in that the income in year one attributable to the value of the use is washed by the interest deduction and, in
effect, taxation of that income is deferred until year two, the year the
interest is actually paid, but no deduction is allowed. This deferral may
be significant, especially where year two is many years away as it was in
Greenspun, a case of a very long-term loan. Thus, hypothetically, if we
assume that the tax liability in year one on $10 of income is $5, and
that such liability is deferred for 10 years, the value of that liability to
the government in year one is only $1.93 (assuming a going interest rate
of 10 percent). 95
Other Problems. Another problem-which was not at issue in either
Dean or Greenspun-is the tax effect of the interest-free term loan on
the employer-lender. As noted by Judge Goffe in his concurring opinion in Greenspun and Judge Nims in his dissent in that case, the constructive income deduction for the employee-borrower may eventually lead
to constructive income for the employer-lender. Presumably, following
the Dean/Greenspun theory, this interest income would be received by
the employer in year one instead of in year two, thus distorting the tax
result in favor of the government by advancing tax liability for the number of years the loan will be outstanding.
This assumes, of course, that the employer-lender will have gross
income. Even this is in doubt. It will be recalled that one of the grounds
for the holding in Dean was that an interest-free loan did not result in
interest income to the lender.9" To support this, the court cited Combs
Lumber Co.,9 7 Society Brand Clothes, Inc.,98 and Brandten & Kluge,
Inc.99 In Combs Lumber Co., the notes given in exchange for the loan
provided for interest, but the corporate lender was held to have no interest
94 See generally Keller at 238, 258-64.

95

5

-1.93
=
(1.1)10
96 35 T.C. at 1090.
9741 B.T.A. 339 (1940).
98 18 T.C. 304 (1952).
99 34 T.C. 416 (1960).
__
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income because the parties intended no interest and, held the court, none
was paid or collected.1 0° On like facts, there were identical holdings in
Society Brand Clothes, Inc. and Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc."'1
Also noteworthy on this point are two cases involving the Reynard
Corporation and its sole shareholder-employee, Fox.' 0 2 Basically, these
cases held that the value of the rent-free use of property was compensation income to Fox. Reynard, the employer-corporation, however, was
held to have no deduction for the amount includable to Fox because it
had included no rental income from Fox. In effect, the court used a
Greenspun kind of hypothetical: If Reynard had paid Fox $3,000 (the
rental value) as compensation, and if Fox had paid Reynard $3,000 of
rent, Reynard would have a deduction, but it would also have gross income of $3,000.13 But, since Reynard had been held not to have any
gross income on account of the rental value of the premises,, 0 4 it was
entitled to no deduction." 5
Applying the Reynard reasoning to our loan from A to B, cash basis
taxpayers, presumably, the interest constructively paid by B to A in
Greenspun would result in no employer income; accordingly, there is
no deduction for A due to lack of inclusion of the income. The net
result to employer A is to give him both income and deduction in year
one, instead of a deduction in year one for payment of compensation
to B, and income in year two, the year when the interest is in fact paid
by B to A. This causes employer A to lose the benefit of deferral of tax
on the income from year one to year two. If the parties had actually
structured the transaction as the above two-payment transaction was
structured, instead of as an interest-free loan, A would have the deduction in year one against other income and would receive the interest
income only in year two.
Although the noted cases hold that the interest-free loan results in no
income to the employer-lender, as interpreted by Reynard, the employer
situation is treated as the economic equivalent of a two-payment transaction wherein A pays B salary and, simultaneously with that exchange,
receives it back as prepaid interest (or rent). The government is injured
with respect to B because of the advance interest deduction in year one,
instead of it being allowed when the interest is paid in year two. The
taxpayer is harmed on the employer side since A must include interest
100 41 B.T.A. at 342-43.
101 In accord with these cases is Letter Ruling 7731007 (April 29, 1977).
02

Reynard Corp., 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934); Reynard Corp., 37 BTA. 552 (1938).
103 37 B.T.A. at 559.
104 30 B.T.A. at 454.
1O5 37 B.T.A. at 559-60.
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has acquiesced in the holding
Besides creating timing problems, there are other difficulties with the
no income/no deduction approach in Reynard on the employer side.
If B, the borrower, is also, or only, a shareholder, the income generated
by the interest-free loan may be a dividend instead of compensation for
services. In such a case, the employer-corporation would not be entitled
to a business expense deduction, but the Reynard analysis would allow
the gain from the constructive interest receipt to go untaxed. Furthermore, even if the payment is salary, the deduction may be limited by the
"reasonable allowance" limitation for salaries,l"s which could reduce or
even disallow the entire deduction. Also, the no income result on the
corporate side will cause understatement of "passive income" affecting
subchapter S status 109 and application of the tax on undistributed personal holding company income."'
Proposed Solutions for Dean/Greenspun. In this part of the article,
suggestions made by some leading commentators on the Dean/Greenspun problem will be described and an attempt to evaluate them will be
made. For that purpose, we will again use our example of a one-year
loan of $100, from A to B (cash basis taxpayers), interest free.
In an early article,"' the position was taken that if we include the
economic benefit of the free interest (in our example, $9 to B), an offsetting interest deduction is uncertain because it is "neither paid nor
owed." 112 Therefore, it was concluded, the Dean result-exclusion
without deduction-is the proper result in order to give inclusion/deduction effect to B.' 13 Where the interest deduction would not be available,
however, the exclusion is not justified. Thus, if the borrowing runs afoul
of section 265(2), the economic benefit of the loan would be included
in B's gross income."' In this respect, it somewhat anticipated the dictum in Greenspun that in cases where no interest deduction would be
available, the Tax Court would reconsider Dean."5 Noted is the basic
problem of the availability of the interest deduction, but not noted are
the other problems addressed by the Tax Court in Greenspun. Nor is
the timing problem addressed.
106 See Keller at

263.

1964-2 C.B. 7.
108 I.R.C. § 162(a) (1). See also Keller at 254.
109 I.R.C. §§ 1372(e) (5) (A), 1372(e) (5) (C). See also Keller at 254.
110 I.R.C. §§ 541, 542(a) (1), 543(a) (1). See also Keller at 254.
107

111 Sneed, Unlabeled Income and Section 483, 17 S. CAL. TAX INST. 643
112 Id. at 653.

(1965).

113 Ibid.
114 Id. at 654-55.
115 72 T.C. at 950.
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Recognizing the various problems on the corporate side,"" the commentator would adopt a similar test for the employer-lender, exclusion
of income and disallowance of any deduction, but only where the lender
would have had an interest deduction if the loan had been at interest
to a third person and the interest received had been paid over to the
borrower. 117 In this manner, if the economic benefit to the borrower is
a dividend, the lender has income and no deduction. This test does not
solve the timing problem, and it is unclear how it affects passive income
problems.
Another commentator 118 would give B, the shareholder-borrower,
income without a corresponding interest deduction, apparently due to
B's failure to pay actual interest. A further justification for denial to B
of the interest deduction is the line of cases, beginning with Combs Lumber Co., which hold that the corporation-lender does not report interest
income. Nonreceipt of interest by the corporate lender is seen as requiring nonpayment of interest by the borrower. 119 Indeed, the two-payment
analogy of an interest-bearing loan accompanied by a cash dividend is
12
completely rejected.
In a recent, and quite exhaustive, article,'' the position is taken that
since B, the recipient of the loan, undoubtedly receives the economic
benefit of the loan as income, he should receive a corresponding deduction in order to give the statute "the quality of rationality." 122 The interest-free loan is equated with the two-payment transaction where, in
our example, B would receive $9 of cash as a salary or dividend, and a
loan of $91 at 10 percent interest. On the corporate side, a business
deduction would be allowed for compensation paid, 12 3 and an inclusion
would be required for interest received. 12 Due regard to the problems
of timing is given to both employer and employee, 125 and present value
analysis is used. 6 The difficulty posed by this article is its justification
for inclusion of income to the employer. In the corporation-shareholder
situation, income is found to the employer on the theory of assignment

116 Sneed, Unlabeled Income and Section 483, 17 S.

CAL. TAx INST. 643, 660-

61 (1965).
117 Ibid.

118 O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-FreeLoans, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1085 (1974).
119 Id. at 1095.
120 Id. at 1095-96.
121

122
123

124
125

120

See generally Keller.
Id. at 240-44.
Id. at 253, 263.
Id. at 259-64.
Ibid.
Id. at 259. But see id. at 232.
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of income,"' analogizing the interest-free loan to a conveyance of an
income interest in cash while retaining the reversion, citing the fruit-tree
TAX LAW REVIEW

analysis of Helvering v. Horst 128 and Lucas v. Earl.129 The author

draws no distinction between a term loan and a demand loan.
It is submitted that, at least for the term loan, the article's analysis
misses the point for two reasons, both of which were discussed previously.13 ° First, there is no reversion retained in the amount of cash
transferred. Again using our example, B receives $9 as a dividend and
$91 as a loan at 10 percent interest, and A, the corporate-transferor
retains no property interest in either the $9 or the $91. Second, and
without regard to the question of reversion, as to the $91, it is clear A
has received full consideration. There is no occasion for applying the
assignment of income doctrine, which is intended for gratuitous transfers.
Here A, the corporation, will be taxed on the consideration received for
loaning $91, the $9 of interest B will pay on repayment of the $100.
A should not also be taxed on B's income from the $91.
In the employer-employee situation, the article discards the assignment of income approach and would find income to the employer under
a line of cases which tax the employer on the appreciation in property
transferred for employee services, Tasty Baking Co. v. United States, 3 "
United States v. General Shoe Corp. 32 and International Freighting

Corp. v. Commissioner.'33 From these cases the article concludes "that
when an employer makes an interest-free loan to an employee, it receives
from that employee a quid pro quo in the form of the employee's services
equal to the fair market value of the property transferred, i.e., the interest foregone. The employer-lender should be taxed accordingly." 134
The analogy to these cases is troublesome. A transfer of cash does not
involve appreciated property and so these cases have no direct application; they were only concerned with a discharge of a debt for services,
past or future, with appreciated property. The resulting sale effect gave
the transferor a gain in the amount of the appreciation. No such gain
is present on a transfer of cash.
Apparently then, what is being discussed is the value of the interest
received by B, the employee, for his services, in our example the $9; as
the article puts it, "the interest foregone." 135 Our present value analysis,
12 7 1d. at 244-47.
128 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
129281

U.S. 111 (1930).

130 See the text accompanying Ns. 35-41 supra.

13' 393 F.2d 992 (Ct. C1. 1968).
132 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
133 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943).
13 Keller at 252.
185 Ibid.
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however, and indeed the author's own later analysis on timing, 136 indicates that the $9 is not interest foregone by the employer; rather, it is a
discrete amount of principal that is being paid as compensation for services. The employer foregoes no interest, and indeed will receive $9 of
taxable interest when B repays the $100, in addition to receiving as taxable income the value of B's services in return for the $9 paid to B.
Conclusion RegardingDean/Greenspun. The present value economic
and tax analysis would appear to have significant advantages over the
holding and analysis in Greenspun, and the proposed solutions for the
Dean/Greenspunproblem.

(1) The present value analysis conforms with economic reality in
giving to B $9 of income in year one and a payment of $9 of interest in
year two. Consistent therewith, A has paid $9 to B in year one and receives $9 of interest in year two.
(2) The income tax results follow the economic analysis. Removed
are all the conceptual difficulties involved in the Dean issue of whether
B has gross income, in improperly hypothesizing an interest deduction
for B beyond year one, and in hypothesizing receipt of interest and payment of expense by A.137 Economically, A has paid an actual $9, and
B has received it; B pays actual interest of $9 and A receives it. No
hypothesizing with respect to such events is necessary; no application of
assignment of income rules is involved.
(3) This approach solves all problems of timing. Instead of all
events hypothetically occurring simultaneously in the same taxable year,
thus accelerating B's interest deduction for years beyond year one and
A's receipt of interest, the taxable events are automatically assigned to
the year in which each actually occurs. We wait for the occurrence instead of hypothesizing and telescoping all events into a single transaction
occurring in one taxable year.
(4) There will be no income distortion-for example, such distortion as is caused by hypothetically allowing to B the full interest deduction in year one and before it is known whether it is available in the
year actually paid, year two. If, for such reasons as section 265(2) or
failure to utilize itemized deductions, the interest deduction is not allowable, those reasons will prevent the deduction when the true accounting
year is used. Also, except for the year one interest, there would be no
exclusion of the gain to B in the first year, preventing a distortion of
the medical and charitable contributions deduction for that year.
On the corporate employer side, true reflection of gross income would
result in no distortions of passive corporate income, no allowance of a
13 oId. at 263.
187 See, e.g., id. at 253.
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deduction for dividends paid, or for unreasonable salaries. In short, all
of the distortions introduced by hypothesizing income and improperly
hypothesizing deductions are eliminated by dealing with what in fact
actually occurs.
CasesInvolving Rent-Free Use of Property. Although the cases where
A allows B to use his property rent free for a term 138 are not entirely
germane to this discussion of the interest-free loans, they were the authority for the Commissioner's position in Dean. Therefore, they will
briefly be analyzed and the tax results will be compared to those suggested here for the term loan of cash.
Assume that A owns the fee simple in Blackacre, improved real estate,
and conveys to B a one-year term, rent free. Blackacre is worth $100
and has a rental value of $10 per year. The Reynard cases dealt with
both A and B. B was treated as receiving compensation by way of a
transfer of $10, the rental value for one year. 13 9 A was viewed as having
neither income nor a deduction. 4 ° These appear to be the proper results
under an economic/tax analysis, except, possibly, for the amount of
income to B. If the tenancy is for a term as distinguished from one at
will, as in our example, B should only have gross income of $9, the
present value of the one-year use value of $10 at the time of the transfer.
B's basis in the one-year term thus becomes $9 since that is his "tax cost,"
because he received $9 of gross income when it was conveyed to him
by A .141
Let us assume further that B uses Blackacre for his personal residence.
B now has further gain of $10 in the nature of nontaxable imputed
income-the satisfaction received from one's own property. 4 2 To
clarify this point, it must be remembered that the one-year term belongs
to B, not to A. B has a one-year term which A has carved out of his
larger estate. Ownership risks have passed to B and the term is his
property.' 4 3 Hence, B's gain from the use of Blackacre is imputed
income, not to be taxed.1 44 Note also that B has utilized his $9 cost
1,8 See, e.g., J. Simpson Dean, 9 T.C. 256 (1947), afl'd, 187 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir.
1951); Percy M. Chandler, 41 B.T.A. 165 (1940), a0f'd, 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir.
1941); Charles A. Frueauff, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934).
139 Reynard Corp., 30 B.T.A. 451, 453 (1934).
140 Reynard Corp., 37 B.T.A. 552, 559-60 (1938); Reynard Corp., 30 B.T.A.
451, 454 (1934).
141 See, e.g., Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp.
184 (Ct. C1. 1954).
142 Marsh, The Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 POL. Sci. Q. 514, 514 (1943).
143 Estate of Stranahan v. Comm'r, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
144 It should be noted that if A loans B $100 interest free in cash for one year,
and if B uses that money to buy Blackacre for $100, B will have $9 of compensation and a $9 interest deduction, while the imputed income arising from his use of
Blackacre as a personal residence will go untaxed.
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basis in producing the $10 of imputed income, i.e., the $9 basis has
fully "wasted" by the end of the one-year term. This is an expense in
the nature of amortization, but because of section 265(1) no deduction
will be allowed under principles of section 167 because the $9 is an
expense of producing income wholly exempt from tax-the $10 of
imputed income. To clarify this point, if B, instead of residing in Blackacre rents it to C for $10, B will have gross income of $10 in rents, and
an amortization deduction of $9-the "cost" to B of producing the rents
is the wasting of his interest in Blackacre-for net rentals of $1. When
the term ends, B has no deduction comparable to the interest deduction
in the cash loan situation. This can be explained by the fact that B is
not repaying a "debt." His property interest has simply expired and the
full fee in Blackacre reverts to A.
Turning to the income tax consequences for employer A, shall A be
allowed a deduction for his allocable cost in the one-year term in Blackacre? Except for a depreciation deduction on the improvement, which is
clearly allowable, 4 no part of A's allocable cost for Blackacre is deductible. As previously discussed, there is a sale for purposes of determining who bears the risks of ownership for the one-year term; but
this is not a sale for purposes of basis offset since A has sold merely a
carve-out, retaining the remainder in a nonwasting asset. As far as A
is concerned, this sale is simply a one-year lease (rental) of Blackacre,
and his basis stays in the remainder in fee. 4
Nor does A, a cash basis taxpayer, receive any income, aside from
the value of B's services, during or at the end of the one-year term.
There are no rents; also, there is no debt, and A is not being paid interest
on a loan at the end of the year. His remainder, however, has now matured to a full fee simple. Admittedly, there is gain here to A of approximately $9 since his remainder goes from a value of $91 (the present
value of the remainder at the time of the transfer to B) to $100 (the
value of the fee at the end of B's one-year term), but this gain is not
taxed to A under our system. 47 Of course, A is also not taxed on the
value of B's use during the term; this is B's. The assignment of income
rules do not apply here because A has received full consideration for the
assignment, as we have already noted.' 48 A, of course, will be taxed on
any income received for B's services, the consideration received for the
145 See, e.g., Rodgers Dairy Co., 14 T.C. 66 (1950).
140 See, e.g., Comm'r v. P.G. Lake,
147 See Joyce & Del Cotto, The AB

Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
(ABC) and BA Transactions: An Economic
and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out Income Interests, 31 TAx L. REV.
121, 123-30 (1976). Compare I.R.C. § 1232.
141 If the carve out is a gift from A to B, A will be taxed under the principle of
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1946).
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transfer. As noted, these results for A and B are in accord with the
decided cases, especially the Reynard case which deals with both taxpayers, except that Reynard taxes B on $10 instead of $9149 This would
appear to be the proper result if the tenancy was at the will of A since
then it corresponds with the demand loan, instead of a term loan, and
the present value analysis no longer applies. This will be discussed in the
next section of this article. The above discussion deals with the use of
property for a term by B, an employee of A, which use B receives as
compensation for services. The net effect of the results for A and B is
the same as if A had rented Blackacre to B for one year, in return for
prepaid rents of $9 and paid B the $9 as compensation for services. A
has $9 of gross income and a $9 deduction for salary. B has $9 of gross
income and no deduction.
Turning now to the dividend situation, assume B is not A's employee,
but is only A's shareholder and receives the use of Blackacre as a dividend. With some exceptions, 150 the results for A and B are identical
with those for the employment situation: B has dividend income and
receives no deduction at the end of the one-year term. A likewise has
no deduction, for the reason given in the employment situation-none
of A's basis is allocable to the carve-out 51-and for the additional
reason that the dividend payment is not deductible to A in all events.
Unlike the employment situation, however, here, A should also have
income in the amount of B's dividend. Since A has carved out of the
fee in Blackacre a term for one year and conveyed it to its shareholder
as a dividend, A arguably has received no consideration for the value
transferred; therefore, A should be viewed as continuing owner of the
term under the assignment of income principle of Helvering v. Horst 102
and Harrison v. Schaffner."' This is the result reached, on the authority
of these cases, in Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. United States 154 where, in
effect, a production payment was carved out of an oil lease and assigned
to shareholders as a dividend.
The second difference in treatment for the dividend situation concerns
the amount of the dividend to B, and the amount to be taxed to A under
Horst/Schaffner. Since A is treated as continuing owner under the
149 30 B.T.A.

at 453.
10 One exception we note here is that the corporate maintenance expenses are
also a dividend to the shareholder; hence, they are nondeductible to the corporation.
See, e.g., Int'l Artists Ltd., 55 T.C. 94 (1970); Challenge Mfg Co., 37 T.C. 650
(1962).

151 But see Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 746 (Ct. C1.
1949) (the Commissioner apparently allowed basis offset).
152 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
153 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
154 82 F. Supp. 746 (Ct. C. 1949).
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assignment of income rules, A should be treated as transferring the full
use value of Blackacre enjoyed by B during the term, $10 on our
assumptions, rather than the present value of $9. This seems to be the
result of the decided cases. 155
These results for A and B accord with the economic equivalent; a
transaction where A rents Blackacre to B for a year at a rental of $10
and pays the $10 to B as a dividend. B has $10 of gross income, as does
A, but A has no deduction.
Demand Loans
Gratuitous Transfers
Economic Analysis

Suppose A agrees to transfer to B $100 with the understanding that
B must do nothing more than repay $100 to A whenever A demands.
Suppose, further, as would be implicit in such a demand-loan transaction, that although B will have title to, and the right to possession and
use of, the $100 after the physical transfer of the cash
(1) A is not required to make any such transfer (i.e., A may
change his mind before the transfer),
(2) A, simultaneously with the transfer, may demand repayment,
(3) At any time after the transfer, no matter how short a period
has elapsed, A may demand return of $100.
The economic effect of such an agreement, stated negatively, is that A
will have made no transfer of any economic value to B, until a period
has in fact elapsed between the physical transfer of the $100 and the
making of a demand by A for repayment.""6 Stated positively, a transfer would take place (1) at the moment of the physical transfer of the
$100 (assuming the transfer is not accompanied by a simultaneous
demand for repayment), and (2) as each moment elapses without a
demand for repayment.
Thus, if on January 1, 1980, A transfers $100 to B repayable on
demand without interest and A does not demand repayment until one
155 See, e.g., Walter V. Liberace, 55 T.C. 94 (1970); J. Ross Castendyk, 37 T.C.
650 (1962). But see Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 746 (Ct.
CI. 1949) (the Commissioner included only present value at the time of the transfer).
156 There is obviously going to be a period that elapses between the moment of
A's demand and the physical retransfer of the $100 by B to A. Whether A or B
is entitled to the economic value of that period is a question determined by the
particular agreement between A and B. We will assume, for the sake of simplicity,
that the agreement allocates that benefit to A, i.e., B must pay interest to A from
the moment of demand.
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year later, on December 31, 1980, A will have made a series of infinitesimally small transfers to B of the use of $100. The total value of this
series of transfers will be the sum of the values of all the transfers, i.e.,
the value of the use of $100 for one year. If we assume an interest rate
of 10 percent, A will have transferred to B and B will have received,
over the course of the year, a value of $10.
If B, in turn, transfers the use of the $100 to a third party for value,
the value received by B as a result of this second exchange may be more
or less than the value of the use received by B from A. If, e.g., B buys
lottery tickets with the $100, B may win or lose. Whether he wins $1
million or loses the $100, however, will not change the fact that A has
transferred and B has received over the period of one year a value of
$10, i.e., the value of the use of $100 for one year.
Income Tax Analysis
As previously analyzed, the gratuitous interest-free demand loan is
essentially a revocable transaction, with transfers of economic value
occurring as value escapes the unexercised power to revoke by virtue
of the passage of time. The income taxation of such revocable transactions would seem to have been settled by the Supreme Court in 1930
when it decided Corliss v. Bowers.15 T The question in Corliss was the
constitutionality of section 219 (g) of the 1924 Revenue Act (the predecessor of section 676 of the Code) which considered the grantor of a
revocable trust as the owner of the trust corpus, and thus taxable on the
trust income. Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, went
straight to the heart of the matter, in language particularly relevant to
our analysis of demand loans:
[Taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is
with actual command over the property taxed-the actual benefit for
which the tax is paid. If a man directed his bank to pay over income as
received to a servant or friend, until further orders, no one would doubt
that he could be taxed upon the amounts so paid. It is answered that in
that case he would have a title, whereas here he did not. But from the
point of view of taxation there would be no difference. The title would
merely mean a right to stop the payment before it took place. The same
right existed here although it is not called a title but is called a power.
The acquisition by the wife of the income became complete only when
the plaintiff failed to exercise the power that he reserved. . . Still speaking with reference to taxation, if a man disposes of a fund in such a way
that another is allowed to enjoy the income which it is in the power of the
first to appropriate it does not matter whether the permission is given by
assent or by failure to express dissent. The income that is subject to a
157281

U.S. 376 (1930).
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man's unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his own option
may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not. 158

Objections to Corliss. Two objections may be raised to the view that
the Corliss decision is determinative with respect to interest-free demand
loans. First, the precise issue before the Court was the constitutionality
of the predecessor of section 676 rather than the proper interpretation
of "income" under the predecessor of section 61. One (and perhaps the
best) answer to that point is that the rationale of the Court is clearly
more responsive to the statutory question under section 61 than to the
constitutional power of Congress. Indeed, Justice Holmes seems to have
had that in mind when he ended the Corliss opinion with the following
statement: "We consider the case too clear to need help from the local
law of New York or from arguments based on the power of Congress
to prevent escape from taxes or surtaxes by devices that easily might
have applied to that end." "I
A more technically correct response is that the statute in question,
section 219 (g) of the 1924 Revenue Act (the predecessor of section 676
of the Code) was not a new statement of tax policy by the Congress;
rather, it was a clarification of what was implicit in the development of
the assignment of income principles under the predecessor of section 61.
That was the precise holding of McCauley v. Commissioner,'6 which,
although decided after Corliss, involved a tax year prior to the effective
day of section 219(g) of the 1924 Revenue Act. In holding that the
grantor of a revocable trust must include the trust income in his gross
income under the predecessor of section 61, the court relied directly on
Corliss, and stated:
It is true that decision is under the Revenue Act of 1924 . . . which
provided in terms that the grantor of a trust who reserved the power to
revest in himself title to any part of the corpus of the trust should be liable
for the tax. But that Revenue Act, as it appears to us from its history,
was merely declaratory of existing law. 161.
The second objection that may be raised to the application of Corliss
to the interest-free demand loan is that the method of taxing a revocable
158 Id. at 378.
159 Ibid.
160 44 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1930).

161 Id. at 920. For a discussion of the development of the law concerning revocable trusts prior to the enactment of section 676 (section 219(g) of the 1924
Revenue Act), see the opinion of the district court in Corliss v. Bowers, 30 F.2d
135 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). See also 6 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME- TAXATION

§ 37.08 n.4.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3 5:

trust cannot realistically be adapted to such a loan. The gist of this
objection is that, although the conceptual base of Corliss and section
676 is that the grantor of a revocable trust remains the owner of the
trust corpus, the implementation of this concept makes use of the trust
as an entity separate from the grantor (and the beneficiaries). Stated
simply, the grantor is taxed on the income of the trust, even though the
grantor is considered still to own the trust corpus. Thus, the methodology of taxing a revocable trust employs the trust as a mechanism to
determine how much, if any, gain or loss is to be attributed to the
grantor. In a demand loan, however, there is no readily available separate entity by which to measure the gain or loss to be attributed to the
donor-lender, since the money loaned becomes the property (albeit generally encumbered) of the borrower and is commingled with the borrower's other assets.
Result. Given this phenomenon, what result should obtain? It seems
clear on the one hand that the practical difficulties of measuring the
lender's income should not result in an abandonment of the assignment of
income principles which require that the income from the loan be taxed
to the lender because a demand loan is essentially a revocable transfer.'0 2
Such a blow to the progressive rate structure of the Code would be intolerable." 3 It seems equally clear, however, that it would be impractical and, in many cases, impossible to measure the income to be taxed
to the lender by tracing the income producing history of the cash which
was loaned. 0 4 What is needed, therefore, is a substitute formula to perform the measuring function which, in a revocable trust situation, is
performed by the trust entity itself.
The approach which would seem most appropriate from the point
of view of administrative/taxpayer feasibility and the proper role of the
judiciary would be to tax the lender on an amount equal to the interest
which would have been earned if the lender charged the usual or prime
162

In this respect, it should be remembered that the assignment of income doc-

trine is of judicial origin and is subject to continuing judicial development. See,
e.g., Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 583 (1941) ("we leave it to future
judicial decisions to determine precisely where the line shall be drawn between
gifts of income-producing property and gifts of income of which the donor remains
the owner, for all substantial and practical purposes").
103 See United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 450 (1973).
164 Considerable difficulty has been encountered in administering the tracing requirement apparently intended by Congress in section 265(2). This section disallows an interest deduction for indebtedness "incurred or continued" to purchase
tax-exempt securities. See Leslie v. Comm'r, 413 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1969). Similar
difficulties were present in the taxation of the income of trusts under the 1939
Code and led to a general abandonment of tracing requirements in the 1954 Code.
See Del Cotto & Joyce, Taxation of the Trust Annuity: The Unitrust Under the
Constitution and the Internal Revenue Code, 23 TAx L. REv. 259, 278-80 (1968).
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rate of interest to the borrower. 165 If, e.g., A made a demand loan of
$100 to B interest free and allowed the loan to be outstanding for one
year, assuming an interest rate of 10 percent, A would be taxed on $10.
B, on the other hand, would be allowed, under section 102(a), an exclusion of $10 from his income for the period in question. This approach
would produce results identical to those which would obtain if A had
established a revocable trust of $100 with income to B and the $100
earned $10 of interest income.
The difficulty with this solution is that A's income is not determined
by reference to any amount of income actually received by B. If B
earns little or no income, A is still taxed on $10.16' If B earns more than
$10, A's income is limited to $10. In these respects, the results would differ from those which would occur if A had established a revocable trust of
$100 with income payable to B. This difference, moreover, cannot be
easily dismissed since the results which now obtain in the case of a revocable trust are more consonant with the basic purpose of the assignment of
income doctrine than the approach we suggest. To be more specific, the
purpose of the assignment of income doctrine is to prevent the shifting
of income from donor to a donee, not to increase or decrease the amount
of income "in the picture," i.e., the amount of income received by the
donee which is to be attributed to the donor. This point is illustrated by
the accepted rule that the taxable event to the donor is not the transfer to
the donee but is the receipt by the donee. As was stated by the Tax Court
in S.M. Friedman: "A cash basis taxpayer is not taxable on income until
he receives it actually or constructively. The making of a gift of his right
to receive income does not cause such income to be received until the
donor derives the economic benefit of having the income received by his

donee." 167
RegulationsFormula. Despite these considerations, however, a retreat
from the desired precision seems unavoidable. As stated, tracing is not
an acceptable alternative. Nor would it seem practicable to attempt to
attribute to the donor some portion of the donee's actual income for
the period in question. It is true that the regulations do adopt such a
proportionate approach for a situation which at first blush appears
analogous, i.e., where a grantor has established a revocable trust and
has retained the right to revoke only a specific amount. In such a case,
the regulations tax the grantor on the income from the trust in accord100 As we will see, this is analogous to the approach adopted by the Treasury in
connection with interest-free demand loans under the gift tax. See N. 189 infra
and the accompanying text.
161 B would still be entitled to an exclusion of $10. Without gross income, of
course, the exclusion is wasted.
167 41 T.C. 428, 436, af'd, 346 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1965).
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ance with a fractional formula where: "The numerator is the amount
which is subject to the control of the grantor . . . and the denominator
is normally the fair market value of the corpus at the beginning of the

taxable year in question."

168

This formula, even restricted as it is to a trust, can be criticized on
the ground that it requires reevaluation of the trust corpus every year
and does not take into account fluctuations in value during any year.' 69
Such difficulties are minor, however, compared with an attempt to apply
such a formula to a gratuitous demand loan of cash to an individual, since,
in addition to the requirement of continuing valuation, there would be
the added problem of determining what assets of the borrower should
be valued for the purpose of determining the denominator of the fraction, e.g., would such assets include income producing property only or
also personal property (i.e., property producing nontaxable imputed
income)? And, even if the pool were limited to income producing
property, would such property include the earning capacity of an individual who earned income from services, thus requiring that capacity
to be continually reevaluated? Other difficulties could no doubt be catalogued; suffice it to say that, whatever the propriety of applying the
formula of the regulations to a trust, its adaptation to an individual borrower would seem to involve prohibitive taxpayer/administrative/judicial costs.
Therefore, we conclude that, absent specific legislation:
(1) The Supreme Court's decision in Corliss requires the taxation
of the lender on the income from a gratuitous demand loan.
(2) The amount of the income should be the amount of interest
which would have been charged by the lender for the outstanding
period of the loan.
(3) The borrower should be entitled to exclude the same amount
from his actual gross income for the period in question.
In terms of our running example, if A makes a gratuitous interest-free
demand loan of $100 to B and does not demand repayment until one
year later, A will be taxed on the income over which he had unfettered
168 Reg. § 1.671-3(a) (3). It should be noted that if the demand loan is made
to a trust, as it was in Lester Crown, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), afl'd, 585 F.2d 234
(7th Cir. 1978), this regulation would literally apply and would require taxation
under section 676 (without resort to section 61), since a demand loan to an irrevocable trust is indistinguishable from a trust revocable to the extent of a

dollar amount.
169 If, for example, a grantor established a trust with $100 and retained the
power to revoke $100, he would be taxed on the entire income of the trust for the
first year, even if during the year the trust corpus increased to $200 and its earn-
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command, measured by the usual or prime rate of interest-$10, assuming a 10 percent rate. B will then be considered to have received the
$10 as a section 102(a) gift; thus, he will be able to exclude $10 from
his actual income for the one year period, whether B's "actual" income
from the $100 is more or less than $10.
Gift and Estate Tax Consequences
History. As with the income tax, the development of the law of
revocable transfers under the gift and estate tax has been tied to revocable trusts. As early as 1924, the Treasury adopted the following gift tax
regulation:
The creation of a trust, where the grantor retains the power to revest in
himself title to the corpus of the trust, does not constitute a gift subject to
tax, but the annual income of the trust which is paid over to the beneficiaries shall be treated as a taxable gift for the year in which so paid.
Where the power retained by the grantor . . . is not exercised, a taxable
transfer will be treated as taking place in the year in which such power
is terminated.' 70
This regulation, the substance of which is contained in the present gift
tax regulations, 7 1 was held by the Supreme Court in 1933, in Burnet v.
Guggenheim,172 to be "declaratory of the law which Congress meant to
establish in 1924" when it imposed a tax "upon the transfer . . . by
gift." In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court specifically referred to and relied on its decision and reasoning in Corliss v. Bowers:
"The statute is not aimed at every transfer of the legal title without consideration ....
It is aimed at transfers of the title that have the quality
of a gift, and a gift is not consummate until put beyond recall." "I
This rationale, which was precisely the rationale used by the Supreme
Court under the income tax in the Corliss case, has both a negative and
a positive aspect: There is no gift on the establishment of a revocable
trust; but there is a gift upon each distribution of the income of the trust
to the beneficiary because at that point, that amount of income is put
beyond recall.
The propriety of the Guggenheim rationale was confirmed by Congress in two separate actions. In the 1932 Revenue Act, Congress enacted the substance of the 1924 regulations. 1 74 Two years later, 17' the
ings increased proportionately. Perhaps this is the reason the Treasury hedges the

regulation with the word "normally."
170 See Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 283 (1933).
171 Reg. §§ 25.2511-2(a), (b), (f).
17

288 U.S. at 283.

Id. at 286.
74 Revenue Act of 1932, § 501 (c).
17r Revenue Act of 1934, § 511.
73
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Guggenheim case having intervened, Congress repealed its 1932 adoption of the 1924 regulation "since the principle expressed in [the 1932
Act] is now a fundamental part of the law by virtue of the Supreme
Court's decision in the Guggenheim case." "I
In view of this history, the definitive nature of the Guggenheim decision with respect to the gift tax consequences of gratuitous demand loans
would seem as clear as that of the Corliss case with respect to the income
tax consequences of such loans."' There is, in fact, no issue with respect
to the effect of the initial transfer of the money subject to demand, i.e.,
it is agreed that such an initial transfer is not a gift. 17 8 There is controversy, however, with respect to whether transfers occur after the initial
transfer as time elapses and the power to revoke remains unexercised.
The government's position-that taxable transfers do take place-essentially follows the economic analysis we have made. This position has
been rejected, however, in the only two cases which have faced the issue,
Johnson v. United States 1' and Lester Crown.180 The major substantive reason for the position of the courts in these cases was that the purpose of the gift tax is not served by taxing gratuitous interest-free
demand loans.
In Johnson, the district court said: "There is nothing about this transaction that defeats the purpose of the gift tax laws . . . to prevent a
person from evading estate taxes through reduction of his estate by inter
The unpaid amount of the loans appeared on the
vivos gifts ....
books, and was includable as an asset of his estate in arriving at the
amount of his estate taxes." 181
The Tax Court reiterated this point in Crown: "Essential to the District Court's holding in the Johnson case was its realization that since
the principal of these loans would remain in the lender's estate at death,
nothing about the transfers permitted the lender to avoid future estate
taxes by reducing his current estate by means of inter vivos gifts of
principal." 182
Fallacies. The fallacy of this reasoning lies in the fact that the inclusion of the principal of the loan in the lender's gross estate does not
mean that the lender has not, during his life, transferred value to the
borrower. The present value of money, as of every asset, is the dis176 H. R. REP. No. 704, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1934).
17 Guggenheim is actually a stronger authority than Corliss since, as the Court
noted: "The question is not one of legislative power. It is one of legislative
intention." 288 U.S. at 285.
178 See Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, 409.
179 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
180 67 T.C. 1040 (1977), afl'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).

181 254 F. Supp. at 77.
182

67 T.C. at 1063.
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counted value of the future earnings of that money. Thus, $100 owned
by A on January 1 is the present value of the future earnings of that
$100 as of January 1. If A loans that $100 to B on January 1 interest
free, on demand, but no demand is made between January 1 and December 31, A's claim against B as of December 31 will still be worth
$100,' s 3 even though A has transferred to B during the year the value
of the use of the $100 for that year. This is so because, even though a
year has passed, the value of the future earnings of the $100 is still $100.
Nevertheless, the future earnings, as of December 31, do not include the
earnings of the year that has passed-those earnings have been transferred by A to B in the year that has passed. No doubt, A still has a
claim worth $100 because there has been an increase in the value of the
right to the future earnings of all the years beyond the first year by virtue
of the passage of one year.18 4 This does not deny that A has transferred
to B $1 0-the value of the use of $100 for one year.
There is another aspect to the position taken by the courts which have
rejected the government's position on the gift tax. As was stated by the
Tax Court in Crown:
The Commissioner was concerned . . . that the ultimate estate would
be reduced by the amounts of money which the lender could have earned
with the loaned funds during the period of the loans. However, that
approach was properly rejected by the District Court because . . . no
taxpayer is under any obligation to continuously invest his money for a
profit. The opportunity cost of either letting one's money remain idle or
suffering a loss from an unwise investment is not taxable merely because
a profit could have been made from a wise investment.18 5
Implicit in this comment of the court is the valid point that the gift tax
is not imposed on a taxpayer's consumption of the use of his own property. A taxpayer who owns $100 is not considered to have made a gift
if he loses $10 of the $100 on a horse race, despite the fact that he thus
has depleted his estate of this $10. Nor, as the court points out, would a
taxpayer be considered to have made a gift if he wasted the use value of
the $100 by not investing the $100 productively. What the court fails
to appreciate, however, is that the reason for these results is that the gift
tax is a tax on transfers and that consumption is not a transfer. If, however, a taxpayer chooses not to consume the use value of this $100, but
183 We are assuming here, of course, that B's financial condition is not such as
to decrease the value of A's claim.
184 See Joyce &Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and BA Transactions: An Economic
and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out Income Interests, 31 TAX L. REV.
121, 123-26 (1976).

185 67 T.C. at 1063-64.
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to transfer that use value to someone else, the occasion for the tax has
occurred and the fact that he could have consumed the use value, rather
than transfer it, does not deny the transfer.
The Seventh Circuit in Crown seems to have made essentially the
same error in slightly different verbiage:
To characterize the mere use of property as a transfer of a property right
implies a broader concept of what constitutes a property right under the
gift tax laws than has heretofore been recognized. The application of the
Commissioner's theory to the case at bar is the equivalent to viewing the
appellee as constructively receiving a hypothetical interest payment on the
money loaned which he then constructively transfers to the borrower. This
raises the problem . . . of whether a tax is being imposed on what the
lender could have done rather than what he did. A finding of a taxable
gift is also equivalent to saying that the lender had a right to receive interest from the borrower-which "indebtedness" he then forgave. It is
true that a lender has a "right" to charge interest in that he is legally
empowered to do so. But absent a contract provision providing othenvise
there is no legal obligation for the borrower to pay interest, which might
occasion the application of a cancellation of indebtedness approach. 180
Again, the simple response to these points is that the use value of the
money loaned has, in fact, been transferred to the borrower from the
lender, despite the fact that the lender did not have to make such transfer, and despite the fact that a borrower is under no legal obligation to
pay interest unless there is an agreement or statute to the contrary. It
is not necessary to find a constructive receipt of interest by the lender
and a constructive transfer of that interest to the borrower in order to
see that the lender has transferred to the borrower the use value of the
money loaned. Nor does the lack of an obligation to repay by the borrower deny the fact that he has received the use value of the money
transferred. Indeed, the ability of a lender to gratuitously transfer the
use value of the money loaned is incompatible with any obligation on
the part of the borrower to pay for this use.
Answers. In the end, perhaps the best answer to all of these arguments of the courts in Johnson and Crown is that they are all equally
applicable to revocable trusts and yet there is no question that as to such
trusts, the Supreme Court has adopted, and the Congress has confirmed,
the position contended for by the government with respect to gratuitous
interest-free demand loans. The Crown court admitted as much when it
said: "More analogous to the situation of no-interest loans repayable
on demand is the establishment of a revocable trust. There the income
payments to the beneficiary are considered gifts from the grantor during
186

585 F.2d at 240.
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the calendar year received. If the power to revoke terminates, a gift of
the corpus is considered to occur." 187
Inexplicably, the court at this point halted discussion of this analogy in
the text and dropped the following footnote: "The important distinction
between a revocable trust and an interest-free demand loan is that in the
former case, the beneficiary is given the income already produced by the
capital, while in the latter the borrower receives only the opportunity to
use the capital productively." 188 The problem with this footnote is that
the stated distinction it draws is palpably untrue. Admittedly, neither
the borrower of a demand loan nor the beneficiary of a revocable trust
is entitled to any particular amount of income because neither is entitled
to the use of the capital for any particular amount of time. In both a
revocable trust and a demand loan, all that the beneficiary and the
borrower are entitled to keep is what escapes the power of revocation
or demand, i.e., the income earned through the use of the capital. This,
of course, is the crucial difference between a revocable trust and an
irrevocable trust, and between a demand loan and a loan for a term.
The fact remains, however, that the borrower of a demand loan is entitled to keep the income received from the use of the money prior to a
demand for repayment, in the same way that a beneficiary of a revocable
trust is entitled to keep the income paid prior to revocation.
We conclude, therefore, that the Johnson and Crown cases are wrong in
principle in refusing to impose a gift tax on lifetime transfers of the use
of money and in thereby creating an unwarranted and mischievous distinction between a demand loan and a revocable trust. However, just as
was the case with our income tax analysis, here, we must face up to the
fact that under the gift tax, the amount of a gift in a revocable trust is
readily identifiable since it is the amount actually paid to the beneficiary
by the trustee; whereas, in a demand loan, the money loaned is commingled
with the other assets of the borrower and the actual earnings received
through the use of this money cannot readily be traced. Revenue Ruling
73-61 accommodates this problem in a demand loan situation by presuming that the borrower has earned a certain rate of interest and taxes the
lender accordingly. Thus, if A loans B $100 on demand and does not
make a demand for a period of one year, at a 10 percent rate, B is
treated as having received, and A as having transferred, $10 over the
course of the year. 8"
187 1d. at 237.
188 Ibid.

189 1973-1 C.B. 408, 409. See 585 F.2d at 239 n.14. As we have previously
noted in connection with the income tax (N. 168 supra), a demand loan to an
irrevocable trust is indistinguishable from a trust revocable to the extent of a
dollar amount. Thus, where, as in Crown, such a loan is made to a trust, the
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Relationship to Income Tax. In the case of the income tax consequences of a demand loan, the approach of Revenue Ruling 73-61, as a
substitute for the precision possible in the case of a revocable trust, was seen
as a compromise between two unacceptable alternatives: (1) allowing
income shifting in clear violation of assignment of income principles and
(2) attempting to trace the earning history of the capital loaned. In
the case of the gift tax, this approach can also be justified as a compromise between two unacceptable alternatives: (1) permitting substantial
value transfers to escape the transfer tax base and (2) tracing the earning history of the capital loaned. In the case of the gift tax, moreover,
it is also arguable that this approach better serves the purposes of the
gift tax than a mechanism which would attempt to trace and tax as a
gift the amount actually earned by the borrower. This is because, even
though a borrower in a demand loan is not entitled to the use of the
money borrowed for any particular period of time, what the lender has
transferred for the period of nondemand is the use value of the money
loaned, and the value of that transfer should not depend on the amount
received by the borrower through the actual use of the money. Anyone
who has the opportunity to use property may waste that opportunity or
employ it productively. Thus, if A allows B to use $100 without interest
until A demands repayment, B may invest the $100 productively, not
invest it at all, or invest it poorly and receive little or nothing. Whatever B does with the money does not gainsay the fact that what he has
received by transfer from A is the opportunity to use the money for the
period of nondemand.
We conclude, therefore, that (1) the Supreme Court's decision in
Guggenheim requires that the lender of a gratuitous interest-free demand
loan be considered to have made a gift during the period of nondemand,
and (2) the approach of Revenue Ruling 73-61 is a proper measure of
the amount of such a gift.
Treatment of Lender. The treatment of a lender of a gratuitous
demand loan under the estate tax is relatively straightforward: If the
lender dies without having demanded repayment, the claim of the lender
would be included in the gross estate under either section 2038, as a
revocable transfer, or under section 2033 as an interest in property.
Under either section, the value included in the gross estate of the lender
would be the same and, it should be noted, would take into account the
actual facts relevant to the lender's claim against the borrower at the
time of the lender's death. In addition, section 2035 would include in
Guggenheim case would seem to require that a gift be found in some proportionate
amount of the actual income of the trust actually paid to the beneficiary. See Reg.

§ 1.671-3 (a) (3). This point was not raised nor was it discussed in the Crown case.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

1980]

INTEREST-FREE

LOANS

the lender's gross estate the value of all reportable gifts made by not
demanding repayment within three years before the lender's death.
Finally, the estate tax calculation, under the unified system introduced
in 1976, would also include all the lender's "adjusted taxable gifts,"
including those taxable gifts which occurred during the lender's life by
virtue of his not demanding repayment of the money loaned during the
period preceding the three-year scope of section 2035.

Nongratuitous Transfers
Economic Analysis
Suppose that A makes an interest-free demand loan of $100 to his
employee B and does not demand repayment for the period of one year.
As in the case of a gratuitous demand loan, this is essentially a revocable
transaction in which A has made no transfer until a period of time
elapses without a demand and, over the period of nondemand, A has
transferred to B the use of the $100 loaned. Assuming a 10 percent
interest rate, A has thus transferred to B a value of $10 in return for B's
services.
Income Tax Analysis
Since we are dealing with a revocable transaction, the income tax
analysis could again be made under Corliss v. Bowers. Under this
analysis, A, the employer-lender, would include $10 in his gross income
since he had unfettered command over the income from the $100 callable on demand from B. A would then be seen as having paid the $10
to B as salary. A would thus have a deduction of $10 and B would have
to include the $10 as gross income. To complete the picture, where A
loans $100 to B, and B in turn loans it to C at 10 percent interest, A
would be viewed as receiving the $10 paid by C to B and, in turn, paying
that amount to B for his services. A would have $20 of gross income,
the $10 received from C and $10 worth of B's services. A would also
have a $10 deduction for a net income of $10. B would have $10 of
gross income, the salary received from A.
Although this Corliss v. Bowers approach is proper, it does not appear
to be congenial in a nongratuitous context and it would seem more
appropriate to view the transaction as an exchange whereby A, by not
demanding repayment, has transferred the use of his money for B's services. Analyzing the transaction thusly, the results are the same as they
would be under the multi-step Corliss v. Bowers analysis. The borrower, B, has received from A $10 (the use value of $100 for one year)
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in exchange for his services. Since this $10 would ordinarily be gross
income to B, the question is whether B is protected by the Dean and
Greenspun decisions. It bears repeating here that the major error of
those cases in connection with a term loan was to protect the borrower
by treating the forgiveness of interest as the equivalent of a simultaneous
salary payment which is immediately prepaid as interest, thus creating
precisely the deferral effect which section 461 (g) was designed to prohibit. 190
The case of a demand loan, however, is quite different. If a demand
loan was interest bearing rather than interest free, the interest debt would
accrue as each moment of time elapsed without demand for repayment.
If, simultaneously with the accrual of interest on an interest-bearing
demand loan, the interest debt was forgiven, that forgiveness would
properly be viewed as the equivalent of an additional salary payment
which is simultaneously repaid as interest when due, involving no prepayment of interest. An interest-free demand loan is the equivalent of
such a series of "forgivenesses" of accruing interest on an interest-bearing
demand loan since the lender has the ability to charge interest at any
and every moment that the loan remains outstanding. An interest-free
demand loan to an employee is thus the equivalent of a series of additional salary payments which are immediately paid to discharge continually accruing interest. In other words, with respect to an interestfree demand loan, as opposed to a term loan, the approach of Dean and
Greenspun does not cause any deferral, since it does not involve a hypothesized prepayment. The forgiveness of the interest debt takes place
as the interest accrues over the passage of time without demand for
repayment. Put another way, it is the equivalent of the employee borrowing money on an interest-bearing demand note from a third party
and the employer discharging the employee's interest obligation as it
accrues.
The interest-free demand loan is thus identical in principle to Revenue
Ruling 73-13 where an employee whose employer paid the employee's
investment advice fees to a third party was allowed a hypothetical deduction to offset against income from the payment. This deduction
would have been available to the employee if the investment advice fees
had been paid by the employee himself. It also involves the same principle which was applied by the Tax Court in Donald D. Focht.191 There,
the Tax Court held that under section 357 (c), the accounts payable by
a cash basis taxpayer were not liabilities since the cash basis taxpayer
could have deducted the accounts payable if and when he paid them.
190 See N. 73 supraand the accompanying text.
191 68 T.C. 223 (1977).
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As the Court there stated: "[I]t is inappropriate to treat an assumed
liability of a cash method taxpayer as income to him and simultaneously
to deny him a tax benefit, if the obligation would have been deductible
upon his payment, for the satisfaction of that debt." 192
The removal of the major obstacle (deferral) to the application of
the theory of Revenue Ruling 73-13 and the Focht case to an interestfree demand loan to an employee should not, however, result in an automatically hypothesized offsetting interest deduction. A deduction might
not, in fact, be available to a particular taxpayer under certain circumstances-e.g., under section 265(2)-if the loan had been incurred to
purchase tax-exempt bonds. In the term loan situation, those considerations were secondary since the application of the deduction offset theory
was inappropriate, in any event, in light of the unwarranted deferral to
which it gave rise. In the case of a demand loan, the removal of that
objection would render it necessary to determine in each case whether
the interest deduction would not have been available to the particular
taxpayer for other reasons. 19 3 At this point, however, we will assume
that the borrower in our particular hypothetical would have had available an interest deduction and that, therefore, the proper result for our
borrower is a "wash," i.e., the inclusion of the value of the use of the
money loaned, offset by the hypothetical deduction which would have
been taken if the borrower had paid interest on an interest-bearing demand loan. Thus, the borrower, B, will have no net income on the exchange with A. He will, however, have to include in his income what he
receives for the use of the $100, in our hypothetical, the $10 he receives as
interest from C.
Turning to the employer-lender in our hypothetical, the question is
normally posed in the form: "Is the employer entitled to a salary deduction?" The question in this form is understandable since the employerlender is seen as transferring to the employee-borrower the use of his
money in payment for services rendered or to be rendered. Although this
is a true characterization of the transaction, it can also be misleading since
what A is doing when he transfers to B the use of his money in exchange
for these services is indistinguishable from transferring his money to a
third party in return for cash, i.e., interest. Put another way, it is the
same, from A's point of view, as if he made a demand loan to his employee at interest, and paid his employee with the interest earned. Thus,
if A loaned his employee, B, $100 on demand at 10 percent interest,
received $10 interest over the course of a year and then paid B $10
salary in return for $10 of B's services, A would have receipts of $20
192 Id. at 229.
' 03 Sce the text

accompanying Ns. 88-93 supra.
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($10 interest plus $10 from B's services) and a deductible outlay of $10
to B for a net of $10 income. When A makes the noninterest demand
loan to his employee B, A receives from B $10 in services rather than in
cash, but it is still the equivalent of interest. A can receive no deduction
to offset this interest any more than he could if he transferred the $100
to a third party for cash interest. Thus, A will have an income of $10
(receipts of $10 minus $0 deductible outlays) on the exchange of the
use of the $100 for B's $10 of services. It should be noted that this
result is equivalent to requiring A to include an additional $10 in his
income (i.e., $20 total) under the principle of Corliss v. Bowers and
then allowing A an offsetting salary deduction of $10-again for a net
of $10.11,
To summarize the results of our example: On the exchange between
the employer-lender and the employee-borrower, the employee-borrower
would have $10 of gross income offset by a hypothetical deduction of
$10 for interest, unless the facts indicate that the borrower would not
have been entitled to a deduction of $10 if he had, in fact, paid $10 on
an interest-bearing demand loan. Thus, the employee-borrower will be
taxed only on the income he receives from a third party for the use of
the money loaned. The employer-lender would have no deduction by
virtue of the loan, but would also have no interest income. The employer's income would be affected only by the receipt of the value of the
borrower's services.
Loans by Corporations to Shareholders
This analysis of demand loans between employer and employee must
be modified somewhat when applied to loans by a corporation to a shareholder. Suppose, e.g., that corporation A makes an interest-free demand
loan of $100 to shareholder B and no demand for repayment is made
for a period of one year. For shareholder-borrower B the economic and
legal analysis is identical with that made above for employee-borrower
B, i.e., shareholder B receives the value of the use of $100 as dividend
income, but such income is offset by a hypothetical deduction if the
deduction would have been available had the shareholder paid the interest. As with employee B, shareholder B will have to include in his
income the amount received from a third party for the use of the money
loaned.
The analysis for the corporation-lender, however, is not the same as
194 I.e., if Corliss v. Bowers is applied to this nongratuitous situation, A would
be taxed on the $10 received by B since A had "unfettered command over it." A
would thus be seen as first receiving the $10 and thus as transferring it to B.
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for the employer-lender because, unlike an employer who receives services in return for the transfer of the use of his money, a corporation
does not receive consideration for the transfer of the use of its money as
a dividend. Nor does it seem determinative that the corporation would
have been taxed without any offsetting deduction if it had made an interest-bearing loan to a third party and used the interest to pay a dividend. Although such a two-step transaction is the economic equivalent
of a corporation making an interest-free demand loan to its shareholders
as a dividend, it is not the rule that a corporation is taxed on all income
which it could have earned but which it shifted to its shareholders
through a distribution. For example, if a corporation distributes appreciated property as a dividend, it is not taxed on the appreciation, even
though it would have been so taxed if it had sold the property and distributed the proceeds as a dividend 3 5
It seems clear, nevertheless, that the corporation in a demand loan
situation should be taxed since it has not ended its control over the
income producing property by a distribution-it being within the power
of the corporation, at any time, to make a demand for repayment from
the shareholder. The corporation, in other words, should be taxed under
the principle of Corliss v. Bowers, since the corporation has retained an
unfettered command over the income. It should not matter that Corliss
involved an intrafamily gratuitous transfer whose purpose may have
differed somewhat from the purpose behind an interest-free demand loan
to a shareholder. 9 " The retention of the economic power over the
income is identical in both situations; this retention of economic power
was the rationale for the Corliss decision. Thus, the result for the corporation-lender is the same as for the employer-lender: The corporationlender would be taxed on $10 under the same rationale previously
applied to gratuitous transfers of interest-free demand loans under
Corliss. The employer-lender would be taxed on $10 since he has received $10 in services from his employee in return for the use of his
money.
Loans of Noncash Property
Suppose that A allows B to use Blackacre as long as A wishes, i.e., A
grants B a "tenancy at will." If this transaction-this demand loan of
195 General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935); I.R.C.
§ 311(a).
190 In the family situation, the income tax purpose is to shift the tax to a lower
bracket family member. In the corporate-shareholder situation, the purpose is to
avoid the tax at the corporate level, i.e., to circumvent the nondeductibility of
dividend distributions.
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Blackacre-is gratuitous (an intrafamily gift), the results seem clear:
If B consumes the use of Blackacre, that is, has nontaxable imputed income from it, arguably A would not be taxed since there is no amount
of taxable income from Blackacre to be attributed to A. If, however, B earns income from Blackacre by renting it to a third party, that
rental income is section 61 income to A under Corliss v. Bowers and is
197
excluded from B's income under section 102(a) as a gift.
For nongratuitous loans, there also appears to be no doubt as to the
proper results on the lender's side. Viewing such transactions, as we
have, as transfers of the use of money in exchange for services, if employer A allows employee B to use Blackacre in exchange for B's services, A has, in effect, rented Blackacre to B in return for B's services
and will be taxed on the value of B's services without any offsetting salary
deduction. This result comports with our analysis of a demand loan of
cash by employer to employee. 198
The problem with a nongratuitous loan of noncash property arises in
connection with the borrower. The borrower in our example has received the value of the use of Blackacre in exchange for his services. He
would, thus, have gross income and would not seem to be entitled to an
offsetting hypothetical deduction because, if he had in fact paid for the
use of Blackacre, he could not have deducted this rental payment, unless
Blackacre was used to produce taxable income. All the cases support this
result for the employee-borrower, and the same rule is applied to a shareholder-borrower. 199 Indeed, these cases are distinguished in Dean and
197 See, e.g., Galt v. Comm'r, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954).
It should be recalled that our analysis of a gratuitous interest-free demand loan
of cash suggests that the lender should be taxed without regard to the actual income
earned by the borrower. Where noncash property is loaned, however, the situation
is more analogous to a transfer to a revocable trust, i.e., it is possible to measure
the income derived by the borrower. Thus, if the borrower has only nontaxable
imputed income, no actual income should be attributed to the lender for the same
reason that the grantor of a revocable trust would not have income if the trustee,

for example, invests in tax-exempt municipal bonds.
The result to the corporation-lender which makes an interest-free demand loan
of noncash property to a shareholder as a dividend, is unclear. On the one hand,
the corporation-lender, like the gratuitous lender, receives no consideration. On
the other hand, it is clear that the shareholder-borrower has income, unlike the
intrafamily gratuitous donee. Stated another way, if the shareholder-borrower who
uses corporate property were considered to have nontaxable imputed income rather
than actual dividend income, it would follow nicely that no taxable income should
be attributed to the corporation. But that is not the case, at least under present law.
It should be noted that the same issue arises when a corporation makes an interestfree term loan of noncash property to a shareholder. See the text accompanying
Ns. 150-55 supra.
198 See the text accompanying Ns. 190-93 supra.
199 The cases are collected in Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 947.
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Greenspun for precisely the reason that a payment of interest is deductible, whereas a payment of rent for property used for personal purposes
is not deductible. Nevertheless, the result to B in these noncash property
cases should give us pause. Suppose that employer A makes an interestfree demand loan of $100 to employee B and B purchases Blackacre
which he then uses for personal purposes for a period of one year. In this
situation, B's income from the use of the $100 loaned would be offset by a
hypothetical deduction under our previous analysis even though B is
in precisely the same position as if A allowed him to use Blackacre
rent free.
This disparity in result should not lead to a revision of our conclusion
that in a demand loan of cash B's income should be offset by a deduction if B could have deducted the interest on an interest-bearing demand
loan. The villain of the piece is not the interest deduction; rather, it is
the established rule that imputed income is not taxable. If, for example,
A pays B a salary of $10 and B borrows $100 on an interest-bearing
demand loan from A or a third party, B can purchase Blackacre with
the $100 and deduct the $10 of interest paid with the $10 of salary. In
this situation, B unquestionably has received the value of the use of
Blackacre without paying tax on it, but it is considered imputed income
and, although it is recognized as economic gain, it is not taxed under
our system. If this result is permitted, as it is, there is no reason to tax
B on the receipt of an interest-free demand loan of cash, even though
he uses the cash to purchase Blackacre, from which he derives nontaxable
imputed income. Remember, the question is whether B could have deducted the interest payment if he had, in fact, paid it; and the answer is
not affected by the fact that B uses the loan proceeds to buy Blackacre,
from which he derives nontaxable imputed income.
But, since an employee has the right to deduct interest payments on
loans used to purchase property which produces nontaxable imputed
income, " ' should not the employee's use, at will, 2 1 of the employer's
property also result in nontaxable income? The only reason for a negative answer would seem to be that two wrongs do not make a right, that
is, the nontaxability of imputed income is economically erroneous and
productive of enough tax inequity already; thus, it should not be used
to cause further erosion of the tax base in situations where, heretofore,
it has not been thought to apply. Such a response, however, should not
200 Cf. section 265(2) disallowing a deduction for interest on indebtedness "incurred or continued to purchase or carry" tax-exempt bonds.
201 It should be noted that where an employer allows an employee to use the
employer's property at will, no issue of tax deferral is presented. Deferral would

be present, however, if an employer granted an employee the right to use the

employer's property rent free for a term.
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blind us to the fact that the cases which tax an employee on the use (at
will) of employer property are based on an economically unsound distinction and can be avoided by (1) the use of the interest-free demand
loan of cash from employer to employee; (2) the employer's payment of
the interest on an interest-bearing demand loan which is incurred by the
employee (from the employer or from a third party) and whose proceeds are then used to purchase property which produces nontaxable
imputed income; or (3) the employee's offsetting a salary payment by a
deduction for interest actually paid on a loan whose proceeds are used
to purchase property which produces nontaxable imputed income.
Conclusion
The history of the tax treatment of interest-free loans has thus far not
been felicitous. This is due in large part to the fact that the phrase
"interest free" conveys the erroneous impression that the use of money
has no value, merely because no explicit charge is made for its use.2 2
As a result, the courts and the commentators have struggled with notions of hypothetical receipts and payments instead of dealing with the
actualities resulting from proper economic analysis.
In this article, we have attempted to analyze the two types of loans,
term and demand, on the basis of their economic realities, and then to
apply to those realities settled principles of the law of taxation. The
results of our analysis will no doubt be viewed by some as requiring
further legislation. 0°- Others may feel that these results are permissible
within, if they are not required by, the presently developed administrative
and judicial framework of the statute. We are of the latter view.
202 See, e.g., Crown, 585 F.2d at 239 n.15: "Money itself, of course, has an
exchangeable value. However, the interest posited here is not money itself, but
the203
right to use a sum of money until the lender demands repayment."
Id. at 241. See also Max Zager, 72 T.C. 1009, 1013 (1979).
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